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Abstract 
This essay accounts for the notion of Lebensform by assigning it a logical 
role in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Wittgenstein’s additions of the 
notion to his manuscripts of the PI occurred during the initial drafting 
of the book 1936-7, after he abandoned his effort to revise The Brown 
Book. It is argued that this constituted a substantive step forward in his 
attitude toward the notion of simplicity as it figures within the notion 
of logical analysis. Next, a reconstruction of his later remarks on 
Lebensformen is offered which factors in his reading of Alan Turing’s 
“On computable numbers, with an application to the 
Entscheidungsproblem“ (1936/7), as well as his discussions with Turing 
1937-1939. An interpretation of the five occurrences of Lebensform in 
the PI is then given in terms of a logical “regression” to Lebensform as a 
fundamental notion. This regression characterizes Wittgenstein’s 
mature answer to the question, “What is the nature of the logical?” 
1. Introduction 
Lebensform is an important gauge of the development of 
Wittgenstein’s thought. It represents, from a regressive point of 
view, the place he finally chased down to. In foundational matters 
such as these, it is often the simplest, naïve perspective that comes 
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last in a thinker’s (or a tradition’s) evolution, the working through 
of how to get back home to the primordial basis, the extraction of 
fundamentals from a jungle of technical accretions. I believe that 
Lebensform functions as part of such an extraction in Wittgenstein’s 
later writings. Lebensform plays, in this sense, a logical role. I do not 
mean by this that it is a “technical” term only, or that our lives are 
only logical. Rather, the notion of Lebensform is recovered, its role 
clarified in thinking through the nature of the logical, which I shall 
treat, following Wittgenstein, very broadly. 
That the excavation of ultimate (logical) starting points often 
comes late in the chronological development of a thinker is no 
accident: it mirrors certain necessities of the regressive method. In 
the foundations of logic, the plea for evidence, for “common 
sense”, for “simplicity”, recurs thematically and repeatedly, but 
most pointedly at the end. The recognition that a certain 
conceptual residue must be accepted irreducibly at the first step – 
and how this is so – tends to come last, and is often the most 
difficult step. 1  For, in the end, the measure of a reduction’s 
significance must lie in the fruitfulness of the resulting re-
structuring of our thought. 
In this essay I will be joining Wittgenstein’s philosophy to 
certain key elements and problematics of this logical tradition, as I 
think he himself did. To re-consider Lebensformen in this way, as an 
end-product of the regressive method, I impose a chronological 
development on his thought. I make much of the fact that 
Lebensform entered at a crucial juncture, the period 1936-7. This was 
the time when he generated the first two drafts of Philosophical 
Investigations (hereafter “PI”) and broke through to his later, mature 
style of writing.2 
Why does Lebensform enter his writing then? I propose one 
answer (there may be others). During this period – we are not sure 
exactly when, but it could have been any time between the spring 
of 1936 and the spring of 1937 – Wittgenstein came into 
                                                          
1 Cf. Floyd 2013b on the history of  a variety of  modern rigorizations following this pattern; 
Russell 1903/1938, Preface (paragraph 2) comments on this very point. 
2 I am not the first to isolate these years as a turning point. Cf. Pichler 2004, Chapter 4.3, Schulte 
2013, and Stern 2017. 
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possession of Alan Turing’s epochal paper “On computable 
numbers: with an application to the Entscheidungsproblem” (hereafter 
“Turing 1936/7”).3 In the summer of 1937 he met with Turing and 
discussed the paper with him, incorporating responses into his 
manuscripts that fall, when he completed the so-called Frühversion, 
or “early version” of PI. 4  If we take this chronological story 
seriously, and conjecture what reading this paper may have done 
for Wittgenstein’s conception of his great life-long question, “What 
is the nature of the logical?”, we can see how and why it might be 
that Lebensformen came to play a certain role in his later works.  
What follows uses a logical construction to construe the 
narrative; the latter is what is philosophically most important. Using 
the perspective framed in sections 2 and 3 of the paper, I argue that 
the philosophical impact these two thinkers had on each other was 
significant and mutual, and that this offers us a novel perspective 
on both. Taking my reconstruction of the logical situation into 
account, I turn in section 4 to a reconstruction of the five 
occurrences of Lebensform in PI. Like a falling barometer, the 
overarching sequence of passages presses ever more clearly toward 
the foundations of logic and philosophy in general. In the course of 
the journey, our very notion of the simple, the ordinary, of 
“common sense” itself, is reworked and recovered anew. Lebensform 
becomes more and more imbricated in everyday procedures, 
highlighting their ubiquity. 
Elsewhere I have argued that it is likely that Turing was aware 
of The Blue Book and/or The Brown Book while still an 
undergraduate, and that exposure to Wittgenstein’s philosophy in 
                                                          
3 On February 11, 1937 AT wrote to his mother that he had “already” sent off  a copy of  the 
paper to Wittgenstein (AMT/K/1/54, Turing Digital Archive 
(http://www.turingarchive.org/browse.php/K/1/54)). He placed Wittgenstein second on the list 
(after Littlewood) of  those whom he had already contacted outside of  King’s College. The 
manuscript had been given to Newman by Turing in April 1936, the very month that Church 
finished his own proof  of  the impossibility of  a decision procedure for logic. Newman did not 
read it until mid-May, thinking at first that it was too simple-minded. Only after reading Church 
1936 did he see the magnitude of  what Turing had done. Turing submitted his paper 28 May 
1936, continuing work over that summer in Cambridge. By 28 August 1936 he had added an 
appendix showing that his definition of  “computable” is extensionally equivalent to Church’s 
notion of  “effectively calculable” (described by a formula in Church’s lambda-calculus). Cf. 
Hodges 1983/2012, Chapter 3. 
4 For all these preliminary versions of  the PI, I rely on Wittgenstein 2001. 
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1932-35 left its imprint, not only on the specific argumentation 
Turing gives in “On computable numbers”, but also on several 
subsequent papers he wrote, including one with explicit expressions 
of indebtedness to Wittgenstein.5 In this essay I broach the other, 
more difficult Turing-to-Wittgenstein direction of influence, 
embedding the notion of Lebensform in a conception of logic that 
belongs both to “On computable numbers” and to Wittgenstein’s 
later philosophical method. 
The argument will be structured in the following way. The 
notion on which I rely, in imposing a chronological frame, is that 
of simplicity. This is a cousin of the idea of the everyday or the 
ordinary, and it is present throughout Wittgenstein’s career. We 
may schematically (and not terribly controversially) divide 
Wittgenstein’s development into a series of phases orbiting around 
his treatment of this notion.  
In the Tractatus, simples are absolute ideals, absolute 
“undefinables”, objects reflected in what we say, and systematized 
in logic as it bottoms out in a well-founded, comprehensive analysis 
of what there is to be said, true or false. Logic is presented 
schematically, formally and operationally, according to a certain 
vision. At least ideally, logic is envisioned as representable from 
bottom to top, relying on the totality of elementary propositions, 
which are mutually independent. Of course, the approach to 
framing any such analysis would be guided by a more synthetic or 
holistic appreciation of interconnections among sentences 
appreciated in our applications of logic in everyday life. 6  In 
particular, the variables Wittgenstein devises for “form series” 
[Formenreihe], presented as step-by-step routines emerging through a 
rule of operation on a basis, are central to his characterization of 
logic, above all his treatment of generality.7 Such series themselves 
constitute bases (themselves, presumably, well-founded) to which 
are applied operational (recursively generated) rules, first and 
foremost using the generalized version of the Sheffer stroke of 
                                                          
5 Floyd forthcoming c. Recently discovered notebooks of  Turing’s on notation indicate his interest 
in 1939-1942 in the history of  philosophers’ quests for a universal language; cf. Hatton and 
Hodges 2015. 
6 TLP 5.5563, Kremer 1992; Weiss 2013. 
7 Floyd 2001a, Rogers and Wehmeier 2012, Ricketts 2013, Weiss 2013. 
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joint denial. The totality of these rules provide the operational or 
“calculative” filaments that, as a whole, allow us to clarify and make 
manifest internal logical relations among things that are there to be 
said. The general characterization of this, conceived as a general 
characterization of the notion of a truth operation applied to a 
propositional basis, is given in the “general propositional form” 
(TLP 6). 
In his intermediate period of development (c. 1929-1933), 
simplicity is re-conceived by Wittgenstein. As is well-known, he 
had rejected by then the idea that at the most fundamental level 
there must be a mutual independence among all elementary 
propositions. Framing a different view of the bases of logical 
operations, he formulated the notion of a Satzsystem, a grammatical 
system of propositions, and insisted that there is a variety of 
differing Satzsysteme. This variety he took to be reflected in 
alternative analyses of given fields of experience. He therefore took 
simplicity – and indeed the very idea of a proposition, possibly true 
or possibly false – to be something relative to a Satzsystem. Thus 
now there are different kinds of simplicity. For example, the color 
field might be analyzed in terms of the primary colors, or in terms 
of the color octahedron. No longer was the truth table taken to be 
a fundamental mode of presentation of all propositions. Instead, 
logic was taken to be more complex, no longer unified by any 
general propositional form. 
This “middle period” view, with respect to simplicity, represents 
a kind of hybrid compromise with the Tractatus. Simples are the 
endpoints of analysis, and constitute a basis for a given Satzsystem. 
Each system is conceived to be a “calculus” of its own. Analysis 
remains, as in the Tractatus, well-founded, bottoming out in such a 
way that sharp answers, Yes or No, are to be delivered to the 
totality of questions that might be posed about what may or may 
not be said relative to this or that sayable within the Satzsystem. 
Simplicity is system-relative, a feature of rule- or grammar-clusters. 
Undefinability (“impossibility of analysis”) is taken to evince a 
feature of a form of representation that we ourselves have set 
down, rather than something that will (ideally) show forth anyway, 
regardless of what we do, as was the case in the Tractatus (cf. BT p. 
Juliet Floyd  CC-BY 
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201).8 Simplicity is thus “subjective” in being something reflected in 
our choices of Satzsysteme; it is “objective” within an analysis of the 
grammar of a particular Satzsystem, being well-founded. Satzsysteme 
constitute – to vary a metaphor of Michael Dummett’s that he 
devised for what he took to be the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy 
of mathematics – a series of separate islands or calculi sitting in a 
fragmented archipelago.9  
Nevertheless, the idea of a formal series, produced by an 
articulated operation or rule applied in a step-by-step manner from 
a given basis, remained a focus of Wittgenstein’s conception of 
logic during this time. No longer construed in terms of the “general 
propositional form”, this notion was reconceived as a formal aspect 
or “feature” [Zug] of certain internally related steps, for example, 
those emerging in proofs by mathematical induction on the 
number series. Number was still characterized, in early discussions 
of the 1930s, by Wittgenstein’s operational concept of form: [0, , 
 + 1] 10 However, a worry about how we get our “hold” on the 
natural numbers – i.e., how we make sense of the first step in this 
series, and our remaining “in” it – was an important driving force 
in Wittgenstein’s Cambridge lectures and writings of the 1930s; he 
did not want a “nebulous” introduction of the numbers. 11 
Characteristically, he still regarded such a formal operation as one 
that would be well-founded. He struggled in his Cambridge lectures 
of the 1930s with how satisfactorily to formulate the very idea of 
definition by recursion, isolating the need for a uniqueness rule in 
an equational specification by May 1932.12 
By the time of The Blue Book (fall of 1933) Wittgenstein had 
made real progress in chasing down a different kind of answer to 
the question of “first” steps and formal totalities or systems. 
                                                          
8 On the idea of  “showing forth anyway” in the TLP see Narboux 2014. 
9 Dummett 1959, 326. 
10 PR 109, 158, PG 431-433, BT 469. 
11 On this see WCLM 6b: 17 (May 1932), discussed in Marion and Okada forthcoming, Goldfarb 
forthcoming.  
12 Cf. Goodstein 1945, p. 407n. As von Plato (2014), Marion and Okada (forthcoming) explain, 
this was a genuine contribution to logic, and one that I suspect led Wittgenstein to teach 
“Philosophy for Mathematicians” in the fall. It is quite possible that Turing attended this course in 
either 1932 or 1932-3, on which see Floyd forthcoming c. 
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Simplicity at this stage is relativized to language-games. And at this 
stage of his thinking the amalgamation of separate systems – hence 
simplicity itself – is represented in a serially presented, quasi-
evolutionary, step-by-step manner. Language-games are themselves 
taken to be “simple”, but also dynamic “objects of comparison”, 
embeddable in part within one another through projection, 
addition, and reconfiguration. Here and in The Brown Book 
Wittgenstein rejects the whole idea of “undefinability” as unclear, 
so that his middle period obsession with internal, well-founded 
totalities of grammar is jettisoned. Moreover, by the time of The 
Brown Book Wittgenstein broke through to what is a crucial 
innovation, his explicitly anthropological stance on language-games, 
shown in his discussion of tribes.13 
But on my view there was still another, crucial, conceptual step 
to be taken. And it is this that is reflected in the change of style 
evinced in the PI. It was only in 1936-7 that Wittgenstein was able 
to embrace the most radical idea, the idea that simplicity is, not 
simply relative to a system, or a tribe, or even a culture, but 
something fluid. Necessarily and absolutely fluid. Necessarily and 
absolutely a matter of ongoing discussion.  
Wittgenstein has thus returned to themes proper to the 
Tractatus, in an odd sort of arc. For the very sake of exactness, to 
acknowledge the nature of the logical, he shows that we always 
have to start somewhere, we always take something to be simple, 
evident, unproblematic. There are always “simples”, in the sense 
that we always take a step from somewhere in reasoning or rule-
following. Yet there is drift in our lives and discussions, and step-
by-step procedures are sometimes partially defined, dropped, 
detached, refashioned, amalgamated, re-ascribed, re-oriented, re-
framed, and revisited. What is a “simple step” may be contested, 
shown not to be so. Analysis goes on, but against a more dynamic 
backdrop. It has no general form, yet it moves from within a 
unified philosophical – and logical – perspective. 
What is different here, in relation to the intermediate, relativistic 
position, is that there remains something absolute and robust about 
                                                          
13 On this see Engelmann 2013a,b; cf. Sen 2003 also on the influence of  Gramsci and Sraffa. 
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the logical, conceived in terms of step-by-step symbolic 
procedures, something that remains a unity, that prevents the idea 
of a Satzsysteme from hardening into a static, divided archipelago of 
conventional schemes, or an artificially ordered series of such. My 
suggestion is that Turing’s analysis of a logical “step” in his “On 
computable numbers” allowed Wittgenstein to have faith in this as 
a robust way to conceive the nature of the logical. 
To be sure, Turing’s paper establishes that there is not one 
system or procedure within which we can decide questions Yes or 
No as to what follows from a set of axioms: this is his (negative) 
resolution of Hilbert’s Entscheidungsproblem. Instead, there are many 
interwoven, recognizeable step-by-step procedures. But these are, 
so to speak, the “overlapping” fibers that hold the realm of the 
logical together as a totality, conceptually.  
And thus it is perfectly logical for Wittgenstein to have 
surrendered the ideal of a “natural”, “well-ordered”, or “gap-free” 
presentation of his thoughts in PI. An album of partial snapshots 
suits his view better. The “gap-free” ideal is precisely the one 
alluded to explicitly in PI as a form of presentation of his ideas 
Wittgenstein realized he had to give up (PI Foreword, 67).14 Neither 
Turing’s nor Wittgenstein’s conception offers a gap-free [luckenlose] 
presentation of logic in general. The command structures in terms of 
which Turing presented his “machines” are reminiscent of the 
command tables of The Brown Book. From one point of view they 
are static, mere quintuples of signs. Yet each represents, from an 
end-user point of view, a process, something dynamic (like 
Wittgenstein’s presentations of language-games). What Turing did, 
by way of this dynamism, was to give us a penetrating analysis of 
precisely that gap-free aspect of the logical that Frege and Russell 
explicitly sought for in proofs in logic. He rigorously manifests that 
notion’s internal limits.  
                                                          
14 I differ with the elimination of  Frege’s term “gap free” [luckenlose] from Anscombe’s and Hacker 
and Schulte’s English translations. This takes the PI out of  the orbit of  the logical. Wittgenstein, it 
seems to me, is clearly making direct allusions to the tradition here. Cf. Frege 1879/1967 Preface 
IV, VI, 1884/1974 §90. Compare Wittgenstein’s 1938 drafted Foreword, where he wrote that he 
had supposed that the thoughts should be well-ordered in a step-by-step series [dass die Gedanken 
darin von einem Gegenstand zum andern in wohlgeordenete[rn] <<einer>> Reihe fortschrieten sollten] (117, 
121-2; cf. his revisions in 2003 to FF, and the Zwischenfassung (hereafter “ZF”) Forewords). 
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What Turing offered through his informal comparison between a 
human calculator and a machine domesticates the gap-free aspect of 
logic, just that aspect Wittgenstein had previously presented as 
central to logic with his earlier notion of a form series. In Turing’s 
paper, “gap-free” reasoning, presented by formulating operational 
rules for generating internally related steps with a finite symbolism 
indefinitely far, is presented in terms of his “machines”. Turing 
shows through his analogy how we can “break off” from a (logical) 
routine and begin another, coming to rest with our philosophical 
questions – at least momentarily – by proceeding, and then, later 
on, refashion what is “simple” by beginning again (cf. PI 133).  
After 1936-7 Wittgenstein’s accent is on the fact that each step 
we take to be simple may itself be unwound as complex: moved, 
critically reflected upon, contested, dropped. And then that 
contestation or amalgamation or dropping may itself, with its 
simples, in turn be scrutinized anew. This is first-order philosophy, 
logic done without falling back upon a hierarchy of types or 
metalanguages, except for particular purposes, which may be 
pursued and moved on from (cf. PI 121). 
Of course, I am not offering here a monolithic account of 
Wittgenstein’s development, but only a suggestion about one 
proximal stimulus and factor, one I take to have been quite 
significant and which has not been broached in the literature. For 
example, Wittgenstein had long rejected the idea of a “metalevel” 
from which to solve his philosophical problems. 15  But now, in 
1936-7, I believe that his perspective has finally gelled. From 
Russell’s (and Gödel’s) vertical, top-to-bottom and bottom-to-top 
axiomatic picture of the hierarchy, Wittgenstein has moved away, 
conceptually: through a disordered archipelago of well-founded but 
conventional calculi, to a serial ordering of language-games, and, 
ultimately, to a fluid, modular setting for human procedures, 
embedded in our ordinary ways of talking as these have evolved in 
everyday life. Turing’s analysis of logic forwards just such a view. 
Our daily lives with “apps” today evince and instantiate the 
perspective. They are Lebensformen. 
                                                          
15 PR §153, WVC 121,123,136, WCLM 3:29 (May 1931), 6:4 (May 1933), BT §109. 
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On Wittgenstein’s mature view of simplicity, the simples (say, 
those inherent in a particular set of commands) are firm points to 
grab onto, just as water provides a firm basis for swimming, if we 
move our limbs in the right ways. But logic is dynamic, embedded 
in our procedures and our discussions and arguments. We analyze 
and we follow rules, oftentimes only partway, taking in certain 
aspects (articulated within analyses) as beginning points for 
procedures, pursuing these until the rules (concepts, procedures) 
give out on us. In water, we may sink if we do not swim, remaining 
active and passive in the right ways. Similarly, in fashioning and 
scrutinizing and offloading our step-by-step procedures in 
language, we require harmonies and agreements among us 
(Übereinstimmungen), and these too require our active interventions 
and passivities along the way: our discussions, our agreements and 
disagreements with one another, the give and take of our talk, our 
interests, and our actions, our appreciation of the point of a step-by-
step routine (cf. PI 242).  
Given the fluidity of simplicity, it is not at all clear, a priori, what 
analysis will look like, where it will begin and where it will end: 
there is no logical essence in any particular place. Yet this does not 
imply that there are no necessities or analyses, that simplicity is 
merely subjective, or relative to a system-choice, much less that we 
cannot make sense of the general notion of following a rule, or the 
idea of mathematical certainty, or of analysis. Instead, we have to 
turn our reflections on logic around, toward the direction of our 
real needs and requirements (PI 108). Algorithms are neutral in 
some ways, and hardly neutral in others. In general, they swim in an 
intensional soup. 
Turing’s analysis of the idea of a logical “step” in a formal 
system shows that step-by-step symbolic procedures do evince 
necessities, but these do not and cannot depend upon one 
overarching proceduralization of thought. Instead, at the heart of 
his analysis lies the schematic idea of proceduralizing, of 
amalgamating routines, as such. This is a perfectly rigorous, robust 
analysis, as I shall explain further in Section 2. It is not grounded in 
any particular place, and is therefore absolute. Its ubiquity in life is 
held up in the settings of human conversation and the need to 
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offload routines to enhance what we say and do, not only as 
individuals, but together, communally.  
It is surely significant that it was not until 1936-7 that 
Wittgenstein surrendered his mode of proceeding with language-
games step-by-step, in a linear manner, as he had done in The Blue 
Book and The Brown Book. Is it not just, as he later complained, that 
The Brown Book’s form is “boring and artificial”, though that may be 
true.16 The turn reflects, not merely a matter of style, but, it seems to 
me, of logic and method. He was driven to the later adaptation, 
evinced in the way PI is written, because, with Turing’s analysis in 
hand, he now realized that he could – or should – continually 
detach, move, rearrange, amalgamate and reconfigure motifs and 
pieces of procedure and thought and conversation (and its ending) 
within one another without end, erasing and revising starting parts 
of thoughts once written down, shifting their force, revisiting 
themes and drawing out variations in a multitude of dimensions at 
differing scales, endlessly.  
The serial, evolutionary linearity of The Brown Book’s 
presentation was insufficiently clear. His new style expresses the 
fact that he now had faith in the unity of logic again, having 
surrendered the earlier, relativized ideal of simplicity. Now, at last, 
the games have depth, even if not along one scale. The 
rearrangements, the cobblings, hold up – within our step-by-step 
proceedings, which may be endlessly interwoven with one another, 
dropped, amalgamated, seen to be fruitless or empty, and so on. 
The logic in language is like an ancient, living city, not like an 
evolved, historical, serially-presentable series of features of culture 
as such (PI 18). 
The literary result is an “album”, a landscape of shuffling 
scenarios of voices and variations, echoing and cancelling one 
another with modulations, self-confessions, re-phrasings, and 
artificial and natural snapshots of philosophical activity.17 This is 
                                                          
16 WC #204, 257 (November 20, 1936). Engelmann 2013b (chapter 4.4) quotes and analyzes this 
letter and MS 142. His view is that Wittgenstein “does not seem to believe that there were huge 
changes in the new version of  his work” (p. 207). But he notes some important differences, 
especially the suppression of  tribes and the use of  the “genetic method” of  laying Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus views down against his mature ones.  
17 Cf. Pichler 2004. 
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dialecticity with precision and without loss, rigorous in its own way, 
a specific form of schematicity without logical schemata. It is an 
analysis of analysis as such, and therefore free of any particular 
choice of formal, sequenced venue. Spades are turned, and turnings 
are discussed. There are simples, but they are fluid, elicited from 
the reader at a variety of different points, from different 
perspectives, for different reasons. 
Wittgenstein’s later style has been called by Goldfarb a 
cultivation of “intentional naïveté”.18 We might think of this as a 
way of figuring and eliciting from the reader a view of what it is to 
think through to the simple, the unvarnished and the natural, an 
arena which is, at the same time, one of unending depth and 
sophistication, a series of arguments about what is to count as 
simple, straightforward, obvious, or given. Wittgenstein had 
thoroughly reflected on the very notion of logic, logical analysis, 
philosophy, itself. That reflection gets him back, ultimately, to 
Lebensformen.19 
The structure of the remainder of this essay will trace out the 
arc of this drive to reconceive the notion of simplicity. Section 2 
analyzes the initial occurrences of Lebensform in Wittgenstein’s 
writings of 1936-7, showing how Wittgenstein came to re-focus on 
simplicity at this time, just as he pressed toward a more general 
application of his ideas, framed his mature style of writing, and 
drafted the earliest versions of PI. Section 3 offers an account of 
Turing’s 1936/7 paper, explaining its Wittgensteinian air, and 
                                                          
18 Goldfarb 1983, 269. 
19 A later use of  Lebensformen (probably after 1946), published in RPP I §630 makes this association 
with simplicity clear: 
1298.«5» Statt des Unzerlegbaren, Specifischen, Undefinierbaren: die Tatsache, daß wir so und 
so handeln, z.B., gewisse Handlungen strafen, den Tatbestand so und so feststellen, Befehle 
geben, Berichte erstatten, Farben beschreiben, uns fuer die Gefuehle der Andern 
interessieren. Das hinzunehmende, gegebene – könnte man sagen – seien Tatsachen des 
Lebens. //seien Lebensformen.//  
[Instead of  the unanalyzable, the specific, the undefinable: the fact that we act in such-and-
such a way, for example, that we punish certain actions, determine the facts as such-and-such, 
give commands, make reports, describe colors, interest ourselves in the feelings of  others. 
That which is accepted, given – one might say – are facts of  life. //are Lebensformen.// ] 
According to von Waedelstaedt, the origins of  this are in MS 133, 284 (7.11.1946), TS 229, 333 
(1947) and MS 144, 102 (1949). I depart here from Hacker and Schulte’s translation of  PI 345, 
which, like Anscombe, puts necessity into the substantive hinzunehmende with a “must” that I do 
not take to be there. 
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insisting, against usual views, that it is not so much philosophy of 
mind or mathematics that are the areas of interest here, but instead 
the very nature of logic. Section 4 erects a conceptual frame for 
each of the five occurrences of Lebensform in PI, stressing the 
importance of his surrendering his reliance on the notion of culture 
(still at work in The Brown Book) and drawing in a discussion of his 
mature conception of what logic is. I will work through a series of 
analogical notions that I take to be central to Wittgenstein’s mature 
conception of analysis and logical necessity: the notions of aspect, 
chain, ordering, and scaffolding, with their attendant notions of 
binding, weaving, holding together in step-by-step surveys of 
reasoning. I show how these ideas were endemic in the history of 
logic, and indicate how Wittgenstein is reworking them by use of 
his notion of Lebensform.  
The occurrences of Lebensform proceed in a regressive manner, 
heading towards what is, in the end the “given”, i.e., the ultimate 
starting point for what Wittgenstein hoped would be a future 
synthesis of his philosophical thought, though this was of course 
never completed. The scheme for Section 4 is this: 
4. Lebensform as a Logical Notion 
4.1 The Idea of a “Chain” of Reasoning 
4.2 PI 19: Form of Life and Logical Aspects, not Culture and not
 Grammar 
4.3 PI 23-25: Natural History and Logic, Regressive Analysis, 
Concatenation 
4.4 PI 240-242: Agreement in Judgments, Scaffolding 
4.5 PPF i 1-2: Übersichtlichkeit in the Tapestry of Life (Lebensteppich) 
4.6 PPF xi 343-363: The Ribbon of Life (Band des Lebens), Lebensform 
as the “Given” 
2. Early Versions of the PI: The Emergence of 
Wittgenstein’s Later Style 
The first occurrence of Lebensform is in MS 115, 239, from 1936, 
Wittgenstein’s attempted translation and revision of The Brown Book 
(posthumously published as “Eine Philosophische Betrachtung”, 
hereafter “EPB”). This was undertaken in earnest in the fall of 
1936, in Norway, and abandoned by November. His use of 
Lebensform occurs in the midst of a struggle over imagining a “use 
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of language” or “language”, “and that means again a 
Lebensform/Form des Lebens” (there are several variants here) in 
which one fixes a “gap” [Kluft] between dark blue or red and light 
blue or red.20 Wittgenstein had previously added to his manuscript, 
for the first time, a reference to Plato’s Theaetetus that connects the 
dialogue directly to the idea of ultimate simples in the Tractatus 
(EPB 121).  
By EPB 292 he gave up, writing that “This whole ‘attempted 
revision’ from page 118 to here [the attempted revision of The 
Brown Book] is worthless”. Immediately thereafter, he faced a 
tremendous intellectual and personal crisis.  
However, that same dark month, alone in Norway, filled with 
confessions and self-doubts, he began again anew, and drew in the 
notion of Lebensform. He drafted what would become, over the 
course of the rest of the winter and the spring of 1937, the 
Urfassung (origin-manuscript) of the PI (MS 142, hereafter “UF”).21 
The first 76 pages or so (through the first part of UF 86) were 
composed before Christmas in 1936. The rest was written in the 
spring of 1937, before May 1, when he left Norway for Cambridge. 
The whole amounts to drafts of the material in PI 1-189(a). It 
contains the origin of PI 18-23, with “Lebensform” occurring in the 
source of PI 19 (the imagined language of only orders in battle, and 
countless other things, UF 16) and that of PI 23 (“‘language-game’ 
is meant to emphasize the fact that the speaking of language is part 
of a form of activity” (Form der Tätigkeit, “or”, as Wittgenstein says, 
of “a Lebensform”)).22 It ends with his claim that the interlocutor’s 
question about the steps not being “determined” by the algebraical 
formula “contains a mistake” (cf. PI 189).  
When he returned to Cambridge in summer 1937 he had a 
typescript made of the whole (TS 220). He showed it to G.E. 
                                                          
20 MS 115, 239, EPB 108a:  
10[7|8] Umgekehrt könnte ich mir auch einen Sprachgebrauch «eine Sprache» (& das heißt wieder 
eine Lebensform «Form des Lebens») denken, der «die» zwischen Dunkelblau«rot» & 
Hellblau«rot» eine Kluft befestigt.  
10[7|8] Conversely, I could also think of  a language usage “a language” (that is, a life form “form 
of  life”), which “fixes” a gap between dark blue “red” and “light blue”. 
21 For a critical edition of  these versions see Wittgenstein 2001. 
22 “Lebensform” is, however, only a variant at UF §24, whereas it makes its way clearly in as a 
substitute for “activity” in the Frühfassung 24 (hereafter “FF”) in 1938. 
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Moore and some other colleagues, discussing it with (among 
others) Turing. Moore would later say to Rhees that Wittgenstein 
told him at this time that The Brown Book had followed the wrong or 
“false” method [falsche Methoden], but now he had come to apply the 
“right” or “correct” method [die richtigen Methode]. Moore said he did 
not know what Wittgenstein meant.23 But we can guess, with the 
power of hindsight. 
A crucial earmark of the UF’s importance is that it is here, for 
the first time, that Wittgenstein thematizes simplicity in the manner 
of his mature work. He added in the fall for the first time the swath 
of remarks beginning with the quotation from Socrates’s dream in 
the Theaetetus: here Wittgenstein models a language-game with 
arrangements of colored squares (UF 47(49); cf. PI 46-76). He 
directly follows this swath with his remarks about “family 
resemblances” (UF 64ff.; PI 67ff.). The swath written through 
Christmas 1936 ends with the question, “In what way is logic 
sublime?” (UF 86, cf. PI 89). And Wittgenstein went on writing 
through the spring of 1937 implementing what Engelmann has 
called the “genetic” method: the dialectical juxtaposition of his 
mature thinking with his Tractatus thinking, to signal effect.24  
Notebook 152, written sometime in the spring of 1937, engages 
explicitly with the problems of simplicity and generality raised by 
the Theaetetus remarks. We should regard it as delving into the 
question with which Wittgenstein had broken off his manuscript at 
the end of 1936: In what sense are logic (and simplicity) something 
sublime? It begins by writing out several examples drawn from the 
theory of continued fractions. In these examples, the infinite 
descent characteristic of an irrational number is controlled through 
systematic substitutions of infinitely long terms into finite terms 
recognizable in the context of definite equations. Calculation 
proceeds, so to speak, analogically, by substituting like-looking 
terms for indefinitely long procedures (infinitely descending series) 
into variables that can be manipulated by means of algebra.  
                                                          
23  Rhees wrote (EPB, 12-13) that the manuscript included TS 221 and that Moore gave this 
manuscript to him to read in the spring of  1938. But the editors of  Wittgenstein 2009 disagree 
(xviii f.), saying that Wittgenstein only had TS 220 in Cambridge with him in the summer of  1937. 
24 See Engelmann 2013a for a discussion of  this new method. 
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Wittgenstein immediately moves from this warmup to consider 
the difficulties about simplicity raised by such examples and his 
new view. He refers back to “the problem” of UF 47, where the 
characterization of the language-game (of UF 38) is transformed 
into a series of three sentence-like commands, ordered n-tuples of 
the three letters “a”, “b” and “c” directing the drawing of oriented 
lines (as in a Turing machine). He asks what would happen if player 
B, programmed with the three commands, “ran out of letters”, and 
points out that there are a variety of circumstances in which we 
would say differing things (e.g., that B had gone out of the game; 
that B can no longer “run”). He is pressing hard on the notion of 
the fluidity of the simples, moving from an example illustrating the 
scope and nature of well-founded procedures – infinite descent in 
the context of step-by-step procedures with irrational numbers – to 
the issue of how the list of finite command strings serves to 
illuminate the issue of simples in the context of analysis into step-
by-step procedures generally.25 
Notebook 152 continues, but on p. 39 Wittgenstein reprises, 
recommencing with a variety of ways of reacting to the Augustine 
quotation. At this point he switches his orientation. He now relies 
on references to MS 142 (the first half of UF), having decided to 
rely on it (rather than EPB) to move forward. By the end of the 
notebook he returns again to the ideas of simplicity and the 
sublimity of logic. He closes the notebook this way: 
The simple as a sublime term and the simple as an important form of 
the representation but with domestic application (152, 96). 
Now why would Turing’s 1936/7 paper be relevant to this? The 
answer is that in his paper (which, as we have said, Wittgenstein 
may well have had on hand in the spring of 1937) Turing had 
successfully analyzed the very notion of a “step” in a formal system, 
the very idea of “calculation in a logic”. He did this by reducing the 
idea of logic as a calculus to intuitive, picturesque, simple-minded 
terms. He boiled down the numerous existing formal systems and 
                                                          
25  Incidentally, in Turing 1936/7 the “computable” real numbers are given by “circle-free” 
machines, the ones that will run, approximating a real number forever, computing via the 
unlimited tape an infinite series of  0’s and 1’s. They never run out of  ink, though they begin with a 
finite stock of  indefinitely reusable symbols, so these never run out. 
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proof-theoretic approaches of his time by comparing their uses to 
the most human, simple, elements of ordinary calculation: a set of 
shareable commands, a piece of paper, a pencil, a bit of memory, 
routines and step-by-step movements. Dare I say it: a form of life.  
We could conceive this, as Wittgenstein did, as an embedding of 
possible step-by-step procedures, circumscribed from within, in 
life. Turing used his standardized, informal, analogical 
characterization of a computable procedure to prove that there can 
be no general decision procedure to determine from within the 
boundaries of the logical whether or not a sentence is a logical one. 
That is, he resolved (negatively) the Entscheidungsproblem. I think this 
fascinated Wittgenstein. If I am anywhere near right, the success of 
this analysis sparked or at least gave Wittgenstein confidence in his 
mature philosophical method of writing. 
First, a few more historical facts. Turing had finished his paper 
by April 1936, and submitted it in May, continuing work on it 
during that summer in Cambridge (see note 3). In August 1936 
Wittgenstein left for Norway. He may have seen a draft of Turing’s 
paper over the summer, before he left, or discussed it with one of 
their mutual friends; even if he did not, he would probably have 
heard a buzz about it in Cambridge circles, and been made aware of 
the (negative) result. As we have said, the fruit of the fall of 1936 in 
Norway for Wittgenstein was his abandonment of The Brown Book 
and his drafting of, first, the origins of PI 1-80 (before Christmas), 
and then, in the spring, the rest of UF, encompassing the first 189 
sections of the PI. 
Turing sent Wittgenstein an offprint of “On computable 
numbers” sometime before February 11, 1937.26 By that summer, 
back in Cambridge and armed with UF, Wittgenstein not only met 
with Moore. He also discussed philosophy with Turing, who was 
back at Cambridge for a visit between his years at Princeton. They 
met with Alister Watson, a close student of Wittgenstein’s and 
                                                          
26 See note 3. 
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fellow Kingsman with Turing who was working on a paper on the 
foundations of mathematics.27  
These discussions pursued issues in the foundations of 
mathematics stretching back to the Greeks, and included exchanges 
about Gödel’s and other limitative results, including Church’s and 
Turing’s. Turing was interested enough in pursuing these issues 
that he considered writing a sequel to his 1936/7 paper, in which 
he would develop the foundations of computable analysis.28 When 
he returned to Cambridge in 1939, and was teaching the 
mathematical logic course, he sat in on Wittgenstein’s lectures on 
the foundations of mathematics (LFM). In future writings Turing 
would evince and explicitly acknowledge his debts to these 
discussions, as I have shown elsewhere.29 
What is important for our present discussion is that like 
Wittgenstein, Turing would drive more and more explicitly toward 
the foundational importance of ordinary phraseology, human 
cultural searches, and the importance of “common sense”.30 The 
chronology mirrored the regressive method for him as well. 
Wittgenstein himself stressed this feature in later writings, 
remarking (in 1947) that “Turing’s ‘Machines’: these are humans 
who calculate” – just before he reconstructed Turing’s argument in 
“On computable numbers” in terms of games.31 
A significant historical indicator of the impact of these 
discussions on Wittgenstein is that immediately after he finished his 
summer discussions with Turing and Watson, Wittgenstein 
returned to Norway and composed, over that autumn and 
subsequent spring of 1938, the first full length draft of the PI (the 
                                                          
27 Hodges 1983/2012. The paper was Watson 1938, in which he thanked both Wittgenstein and 
Turing for his knowledge of  Gödel’s theorems. Wittgenstein admired the paper, on which see 
Floyd 2001b, Floyd and Putnam 2012, Floyd forthcoming c.  
28 Hodges tells us that Turing was “overoptimistic” about rewriting the foundations of  analysis at 
this time (1999, 19). Gandy 1988, 82, n. 25 explains that it was the fact that not all real numbers 
have unique representations as binary decimals that led Turing away from the topic (cf. Turing 
1937, where at the suggestion of  Bernays Turing includes a reference to Brouwer’s overlapping 
sequences treatment of  real numbers). Serving as examiner of  Goodstein’s PhD thesis in 1938, 
Turing noted large errors due to these ambiguities of  representation. 
29 Floyd 2013a, forthcoming c. 
30 Floyd forthcoming c. 
31 RPP 1096-7 (from MS 135, p. 118). For discussion see Floyd 2012c. 
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so-called Frühfassung, or “Early Version”, hereafter “FF”).32 In his 
initial manuscript remarks, begun in August 1937 in Cambridge and 
continued after his arrival in Norway in September, he worked up 
the first draft of his famous remarks about the idea of a machine 
symbolizing its own mode of action33, as well as his first series of 
remarks probing the philosophical relevance of Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorems.34 It is reasonable to take these remarks to 
register the stimulus of the 1937 conversations with Turing and 
Watson in Cambridge. 
FF is a draft of PI that extends UF past the origin of PI 189 by 
applying the perspective to the foundations of logic and 
mathematics. Wittgenstein would eventually submit this to 
Cambridge University Press as part of his bid to become Professor. 
In this manuscript his mature view of simplicity is applied, and a 
different focus from the one worked up in the years 1929-1934 
emerges. Wittgenstein always envisioned his second book, until late 
in his life, as having a particular structure, one which FF 
instantiated (cf. PPF xiv 372). In the first part, the nature of sense, 
thought, and meaning would be clarified. In the second part this 
conception would be applied to logic, philosophy, intention, 
idealism, and, finally, the foundations of mathematics. That last 
part was a constraint on success, for Wittgenstein, as it has not 
always been for his readers. He bound himself to it, as a standard 
of rigor. (The Big Typescript (TS 213, hereafter “BT”) adheres to this 
form.) 
If I am right, it is the new ideal of simplicity that shapes this 
material. This explains Wittgenstein’s odd yet focussed 
determination to make sense of first steps into logic and 
mathematics. These are now subjected to the idea that we cannot 
really experience or ideate them directly, in an empiricist’s way, or 
even in terms of the metaphor of a “step”, much less a theory of 
logic or concepts. The elementary primitiveness of the examples 
                                                          
32 This is a continuation of  TS 220 into what would become TS 221 (with a Foreword in TS 225). 
Floyd 1991 analyzes this context line by line, with attention to the manuscript composition. 
33 119, 28; cf. PI 193, FF 349, RFM I 122. As for precursor remarks, at WCLM 5: 43 (May 1930) 
Wittgenstein does discuss the idea of  looking at a machine as an expression of  a rule or possible 
motion. But not the machine symbolizing its own actions. 
34 MS 118, 211ff., cf. FF 383ff; cf. RFM I Appendix III. 
Juliet Floyd  CC-BY 
 26 
stalked in this manuscript is then not a merely pedagogical conceit 
of Wittgenstein’s, much less a reflection of his ignorance of 
mathematics or a kind of ideological commitment to the non-
technical.35 Instead, it is a logical must, demanded by – but also 
clarified in a reaction to – Turing’s work. Wittgenstein had to 
regress backward, to the simples, and see them rightly. 
The remarks in the second part of FF were never satisfactorily 
finished, and Wittgenstein dropped them from subsequent versions 
of the PI. The issues were certainly at stake in the exchanges that 
continued between Turing and Wittgenstein in 1939 (LFM). 36  It 
seems Wittgenstein may have hoped eventually to return to the 
material, and keep the original mode of organization envisioned for 
his book, but he never completed this task. Instead, the remarks 
extending the UF were published posthumously, as Part I of 
Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (hereafter “RFM”). It is not 
my aim here to give a reading of them along the lines I have just 
suggested, though elsewhere I hope to do so. I have only noted the 
sequence of historical steps to prepare my logical reconstruction of 
a larger scheme. 
3. Turing’s “On computable numbers, with an application 
to the Entscheidungsproblem” (1936/7) 
A brief remark about how I read Turing is incumbent at this point. 
For it is customary – and not only among Wittgenstein scholars – 
to regard Turing as a kind of arch mechanist in the philosophy of 
mind, or at least, a kind of computationalist-behaviorist-
reductionist. Read in this way, Turing is a philosophical enemy of 
Wittgenstein’s, if not a clear object of philosophical attack in PI.37 
The tradition of reading Turing psychologistically, in this way, 
began quite early, invited, to some extent, by Turing himself. First, 
he was embraced as a kind of hero by functionalists, AI-
enthusiasts, and cognitive scientists. And then he was criticized as 
an arch mechanist by philosophers, including Gödel, who argued 
                                                          
35 This is also emphasized in Floyd and Mühlhölzer (manuscript), in relation to Wittgenstein’s 
1941-44 criticisms of  the “extensional” point of  view on the real numbers. 
36 Floyd forthcoming c. 
37 Kripke 1981, Shanker 1998, the latter discussed in Floyd 2012c. 
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vociferously against what he regarded as a dogma in Turing’s work: 
the assumption that states of mind of humans are finite in 
character, and discrete.38 The opposing legacy of computationalism 
and functionalism in the philosophy of mind is well-known. 
There is insufficient space here to argue against this widely-held 
view of Turing, though I have provided varied grounds for an 
alternative interpretation elsewhere. 39  Here I shall just sketch 
another, more Wittgensteinian reading of Turing. It will be enough 
to insist that although the notion of a “state of mind” does appear 
in Turing’s paper, it does not do any substantial metaphysical or 
argumentative work there. After all, mathematical theorems cannot 
be proved on the basis of theories of mental states. Instead, 
Turing’s remarks form part of an analogy, a powerful one that 
Wittgenstein appreciated. The important point is that this analogy 
was just perfect for the Hilbertian context into which Turing was 
inserting his work. 
First let us be clear about the logic of the situation in 1936. 
Turing’s analysis of a “step” in a formal system – as I have said, 
partly inspired by Wittgenstein’s lectures and dictations – is a 
logical must. To show that there is no general procedure or “definite 
method” for determining, in a finite number of steps, whether or 
not a sentence of a formal system does or does not follow from the 
axioms, one must first clarify what in general it would have been to 
have such a general method in hand. (In contrast, a positive proof 
that there is a definite method – or formal proof, or algorithm – 
merely requires that we produce it.) In other words, in order to 
show what formalisms cannot do – which is above all what Turing 
showed in “On computable numbers” – one is obliged to give a 
general analysis of the very idea of a “formal system”, or a 
“systematic procedure”, in the relevant Hilbertian sense. One must 
clarify what the nature of formal systems are in general, the very idea 
of one. 
                                                          
38 See the note Gödel added to his “Some remarks on the undecidability results” 1972a, in Gödel 
1990, 304. Gödel accuses Turing of  a “philosophical error” in failing to admit that “mind, in its 
use, is not static, but constantly developing”, as if  the appropriateness of  Turing’s analysis turns 
on denying that mental states might form a continuous series. Critical discussions of  this in 
relation to Turing are given in Webb 1990 and Floyd 2012c.  
39 Floyd 2012c, 2013a, forthcoming c. 
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To do this one cannot simply write down another formalism, or 
keep on urging people to do so, as did Carnap.40 That will not do. 
Nor may one invoke the idea of a “metalevel”. For that would have 
no hope of analyzing the general idea of a “step” in a formal system. 
In the end one cannot resort directly to formalized means – 
although whatever one writes down, it must be provably robust 
enough to handle any and all possible formalisms of the relevant 
kind and be able itself to serve as one. The very idea of writing 
down a “letter”, “phrase” or “symbol” in the context of a step-by-
step procedure must be indefinitely schematized. And this is what 
Turing did. 
The logical need for something vivid and “profoundly 
ordinary”41 is what Turing’s analysis supplied, and that is why it is a 
remarkable piece of “applied philosophy” 42 , a “paradigm of 
philosophical analysis”.43 He unvarnished symbolic logic, making the 
idea of a formal system (in the relevant sense) plain. Turing analyses 
what a formal system is by showing us what a formal system is for, 
how it is used. The analysis explicitly turns on an informal 
“comparison” between a human calculator using pencil and paper, 
following a series of determinate commands, and a mechanical 
process implemented by a machine.44 It is a “language-game”, an 
object of comparison (cf. PI 130-131), drawing the human, with its 
“form of life”, vividly into the foundations. Probably inspired by 
reading The Blue Book and/or The Brown Book, Turing realized how 
to characterize the relevant notion in a general way. 
As Gandy wrote (1988, 85), “Let us praise the uncluttered 
mind”. Turing’s lack of a theory of mind, or commitment to any 
particular theory of mentality, is confirmed by the argumentation in 
his (1936/7). In the course of the paper, Turing explicitly replaces 
the notion of a “state of mind” with a shareable counterpart: a 
command that may be dropped and passed off to another 
                                                          
40 This, I think, is why Wittgenstein said he would throw up his milkshake at the bar if  Findlay 
went on talking about Carnap’s merits (Findlay 1985, 58). On Turing vs. Carnap see Floyd 2012b. 
41 Hodges 1983/2012, 96. 
42 Davis 1982, 14. 
43 Gandy 1988, 6; cf. Floyd forthcoming c. 
44 Turing 1936/7 §1. 
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computor.45 And in terms of this object of comparison he is able to 
(negatively) resolve the Entscheidungsproblem for logic. Ramsey had 
once called this a “leading problem of mathematical logic”, and 
solved a partial form of it (positively).46 Turing showed that there is 
nothing like this partial result for the general case, for the whole of 
logic (in the relevant sense). And so, just as Wittgenstein remarked, 
any further “leading problem of mathematical logic” could be 
regarded as a mathematical problem “like any other”, i.e., one that 
will not dislodge or re-ground our general conception of logic (cf. 
PI 124). 
Another indication that a Wittgensteinian air permeates Turing’s 
use of this analysis is a striking feature of the particular argument 
he gives. His argument is, as has rarely been noticed – though it 
was explicitly stressed by Wittgenstein47 – idiosyncratic. For Turing’s 
argument does not rely on negation. This means that it applies, not 
only to classical logic, but any other formal system of logic, be it 
intuitionistic, constructivist, finitist, and so on. It is not really a 
diagonal argument of the kind used, for example, in Gödel’s 
incompleteness argument (1931). 
What Turing does instead is to show that if there were a general 
decision procedure for determining whether or not a sentence in a 
formal system does or does not follow from the axioms, this would 
give us the wherewithal to construct a defective machine, one that 
is infected with an empty command, something of the form, “Do 
what you do”. I call it the “Do-what-you-do” machine.48 
Imagine drawing a card in a game that says “Do what you do”. 
This command is something even more bare than a tautology. We 
can see, by inspection, that although it is definable, it cannot be 
followed. The difficulty takes us beyond what step-by-step 
procedures are – unsupplemented by a specific context. Of course, 
in everyday life the form of words “do what you do” might find a 
use (if I am, for example, coaching you to continue onward with a 
                                                          
45 Turing 1936/7, 253 (III of  §9). 
46 Ramsey’s remark is in his 1930, 26; cf. PI 124d. 
47 RPP I 1096ff, discussed in Floyd 2012c. 
48 The argument is reconstructed in detail, with reference to Wittgenstein’s remarks and Turing 
1936/7, in Floyd 2012c, and discussed further in Floyd forthcoming c. 
Juliet Floyd  CC-BY 
 30 
specific action you are practising at). But that is not the sort of 
context at issue in this case. With an appropriate context in life, the 
rule can be followed; but without one, not. We have reached the 
limits of step-by-step procedures in formal logic, just as Turing 
wanted to show. They lie in everyday life. 
By not building negation directly into his argument, then, Turing 
is doing something distinctive, making his argument more general. 
He throughly develops his analogy with the human being engaged 
in a calculating procedure. And what he does importantly differs 
from the now usual way of proving the negative resolution of the 
Entscheidungsproblem with the “Halting Argument”. 49  Here one 
constructs a “contrary” machine that negates the results of other 
machines as it goes down the diagonal, resulting in a contradiction. 
In this case, negation is built in to the machine. Turing’s argument 
does not proceed in this way, for the sake of generality and 
philosophical clarity. 
In Turing’s way of making the argument, the notion of a general 
decision procedure for logic ultimately falters on two things: 1. an 
analysis of what a formal system is in terms of an analogy with a 
human computor, and 2. the construction of a rule that cannot be 
followed without supplementation of a context. Turing shows how 
logic cannot provide general definite methods of the kind Hilbert 
had sought, but from within pure logic, by means of logic alone. 
There is no theory of mind or of logic behind this. Only logic, as 
humans use it. 
Turing’s paper must have struck Wittgenstein. After all, 
Wittgenstein himself had been the first to frame the idea of a 
decision procedure for all of logic in 1913, in a letter to Russell: this 
was his problem. 50  And the Hilbertian ideal expressed in the 
                                                          
49  Martin Davis is presumed to have been the first to give this argument in 1952 (http:// 
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halting_problem#History_of_the_halting_problem); cf. Copeland 2004, 
40 n 61. Copeland (2004, 38) reconstructs Turing’s 1936/7 argument as a regress argument, but 
this is yet another rendition, as Floyd 2012c argues.  
50 WC, #30-37 (November or December 1913 to February 18, 1914), 56-69; cf. Dreben and Floyd 
1991, 32. 
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Entscheidungsproblem, the idea of “calculation in a logic”, was in a 
sense a logical ideal of the Tractatus.51 
There is a further point that supports, as I see it, an 
a-psychological reading of Turing’s great paper. Turing’s result is 
“absolute”. Gödel himself described this feature of the analysis as 
nothing short of a “miracle”: 
It seems to me that [the] importance [of Turing’s analysis] is largely 
due to the fact that with this concept [computability] one has for the 
first time succeeded in giving an absolute definition of an interesting 
epistemological notion, i.e., one not depending on the formalism 
chosen. In all other cases treated previously, such as demonstrability 
or definability, one has been able to define [the fundamental notions] 
only relative to the given language, and for each individual language it 
is clear that the one thus obtained is not the one looked for. For the 
concept of computability, however, although it is merely a special kind 
of demonstrability or decidability, the situation is different. By a kind 
of miracle it is not necessary to distinguish orders, and the diagonal 
procedure does not lead outside the defined notion. 52  
Gödel insisted, in fact, that it was Turing who had established 
the general applicability of his own incompleteness theorems: 
before Turing had clarified the notion of a “formal system”, the 
scope of what Gödel’s results showed was just not clear.53 But no 
theory of mind could have helped to accomplish this. 
Of course, Turing’s analysis recaptured and exploited 
Gödelization, the possibility of coding the behavior of any formal 
system. For the “absoluteness” of Turing’s analysis is shown by the 
fact that just one “Universal” machine may, with a straightforward 
coding, do the work of all. The Universal machine offers a robust 
                                                          
51 The literature on whether or not the Tractatus was committed to a decision procedure for logic is 
longstanding. I believe it was not, though the situation must be rationally reconstructed, as 
Wittgenstein was hazy around the margins. Some arguments were given in Dreben and Floyd 1991 
and Floyd 2001a, but more precise reconstructions were offered in Sundholm 1992 and Rogers 
and Wehmeier 2012. Weiss 2013 and forthcoming, so far as I am concerned, satisfactorily analyze 
the logic in the Tractatus as a predicative fragment of  second order logic, pinning down the (very 
high) complexity of  the definability of  logical consequence given Wittgenstein’s basic framework. 
52 See Gödel 1946/1990, 150, discussed in Floyd forthcoming c; Sieg 2006, especially pp. 472ff  
and Kennedy 2014. 
53 In Gödel 1986, 195 (a note added in 1963 to a reprinting of  his famous 1931 incompleteness 
paper), Turing’s analysis was called “a precise and unquestionably adequate definition of  the 
general notion of  formal system”, one allowing a “completely general version” of  his theorems to 
be proved. 
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characterization of the general idea of a “step” in a formal system, 
while demonstrating that the fluidity of simples in practice does not 
jeopardize the unity of logic.  
Each individual Turing machine is given by a list of symbols 
and commands. Each individual machine has its “simples”. And yet 
each of these “beginnings” nevertheless finds its place in the one 
Universal machine, which in any case is (like all the other machines) 
set against the backdrop of our human procedures writing down 
step-by-step procedures for computing. Instead of mental states, 
one should think of a large insurance office with hundreds of 
people working at calculating machines, handing off results to one 
another throughout the day: one can imagine adding on further and 
further rooms and workers, horizontally and vertically, without 
ever meeting an intrinsic barrier to adding on further (except 
resources, interests, and purposes). The basic context is a social 
one. 
Turing Machines, like people, are offloading platforms for 
calculative tasks. Discussion of theories of mind misses this point, 
whereas descriptions that respect variability, purposes, 
environments and needs do not. Turing showed, of course, that the 
Universal machine cannot generally survey and predict, of its own 
accord, the step-by-step behavior of all and every machine. But this 
is not, so to speak, because it is working on itself. Instead, the 
totality of computable functions cannot be diagonalized out of: it is 
not to be transcended in that particular way, in that “computable” 
is not the same as “true”. For in the general case there are partial 
functions, certain systems of definable commands that do not yield 
a result on a given input – there is “nonsense” in that sense. Each 
machine is capable of working on its own commands and states 
and outputs – including the Universal one, which thereby works on 
all commands, states, inputs and outputs. What the Universal 
machine implies, as Davis has argued (Forthcoming), is that there is 
no trichotomy between data (input, given experience), software (rule, 
calculation, inference) and hardware. Instead, the boundaries here 
too are fluid.  
Wittgenstein would have seen and appreciated this much. Such 
appreciation would have given him faith in his own new ideal of 
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the fluidity of simplicity, as well as the fundamental power of his 
uses of language-games. The notion of a symbolically formulated, 
step-by-step procedure, so central to his conception of the logical 
since the Tractatus, had itself been logically, i.e., philosophically, 
analyzed. It would hold up.  
The dream of an overarching calculus of logic, a well-founded 
picture of the world based on simples, or relative simples, or a 
series of simples, had to be surrendered: the Entscheidungsproblem 
was resolved in the negative. And yet, thanks to Turing, an 
absolute, self-standing conception of logic could be coupled with a 
primary emphasis on the fact that “common sense” (scrutinized 
endlessly, of course) would be required to fashion routines and 
allow us to understand and implement logic. Logic and our ideals 
of precision can and will survive this. But only by being 
transformed, situated in the realm of our ordinary discussions and 
procedures, to and fro, those harmonies among us as to purpose, 
point of view, and the sequencing of certain steps and procedures 
in our lives.  
Toward the end of his life, partly under Wittgenstein’s 
influence, Turing himself came to emphasize these very points. His 
(1944/5) paper calling for a “Reform of Mathematical Notation 
and Phraseology” expresses his debt to Wittgenstein’s 1939 lectures 
(LFM) in helping him formulate a version of the theory of types. 
Centrally, he stressed here the need for everyday “common sense” 
“phraseology” as part and parcel of the development of logic.54 In 
his report on “Intelligent Machinery” (1948/1992) he stressed the 
importance of “the cultural search”, by which he meant human 
cultural searching, with no machines mentioned as part of this, the 
individual regarded as a small portion of the whole society. 55 
Turing’s famous “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” (1950) – 
which Wittgenstein seems never to have read – was a lighthearted 
joust at philosophers, and argues, not for mechanism in the 
                                                          
54 Turing 1944/5, cf. my commentary Floyd 2013a and Floyd forthcoming c. 
55 Turing 1948/1992, second to last section of the report. 
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philosophy of mind, or genuine artificial intelligence, but instead 
that we have no fixed, general definition of “intelligence”.56  
Finally, in the very last paragraph of the very last paper he wrote 
Turing remarked that 
These [limitative] results, and some other results of mathematical 
logic, may be regarded as going some way towards a demonstration, 
within mathematics itself, of the inadequacy of ‘reason’ unsupported 
by common sense (1954, p. 23). 
Lebensform in Wittgenstein becomes a kind of replacement for 
this version of the wider Cambridge notion of “common sense”.57 
My point here is that this rigorization resonates well with 
Wittgenstein’s mature conception of philosophy. 
4. Lebensform as a Logical Notion 
4.1 The Idea of a “Chain” of Reasoning 
I am arguing that while it occurs but five times in the Investigations, 
the timing of the initial occurrences of Lebensform in Wittgenstein’s 
manuscripts reflects an important gauge of Wittgenstein’s 
development. As I will explain below, this is reflected in the fact 
that his uses of the notion are progressively embedded in a wider 
flow of thinking about the concepts of form and life – most 
importantly, the notion of the logical – and finally then turned 
toward notions of certainty at work in the foundations of 
mathematics. In a broad sense, in Wittgenstein’s philosophy the 
accent seems to approach more and more to life as time goes on. 
But logic, with its ideas of form, possibility, necessity, and its (endemic) 
metaphor of chains of remarks (or reasoning) (cf. PI Preface), is never 
left behind as part of the quarry. Wittgenstein still conceived 
                                                          
56 Wittgenstein wrote to Malcolm of Jan. 12, 1950 that he “had not read” the paper but “I would imagine it 
is no leg pull” (WC #429, 469). Malcolm had evidently suspected it might be. Gandy 2004, 125, reports that 
“I can remember [Turing] reading aloud to me some of the passages – always with a smile, sometimes with 
a giggle”, inferring that perhaps the paper was not meant to bear too much weight, but was instead to make 
“propaganda” for the philosophical significance of what Turing was doing with stored program computers. 
On there being no general definition of “intelligence” in Turing 1936/7, see Winston forthcoming. 
57 See Floyd forthcoming c. 
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himself to be pursuing the nature of the logical, conceived of what 
he is doing as logic, sees philosophy as logic, until the end.58 
This emphasis on form-as-logical has usually not been argued 
for in connection with Wittgenstein’s uses of “Lebensform”. Most 
readers have focussed narrowly – either on piecemeal “language-
games” or the programming of our active behavior with words in 
terms of training in rules – or widely, thinking of Lebensformen as 
ways of life in the large, cultures, or organic internalizations of 
potential ways of acting in individuals who belong to certain 
cultures. 59  The former fits the stress on variety of differing 
snapshots or models of language use invoked in §§19 and 23; the 
latter seems invited by Wittgenstein’s exploration of the concepts 
of hope and grief in PPF i §1, where he begins by contrasting a dog 
with a human being. But in either sort of reading Wittgenstein’s 
association of Lebensform with scaffolding and logic, with binding 
and weaving, with handwriting, charactery, and certainties in our 
proceedings, including in mathematics (in PI §§240-242 and PPF xi 
§§345-362) is unfortunately lost. We need to unbury this cluster of 
associations in which Lebensform is embedded.  
In general, the way to unbury it is to stress the centrality to 
Wittgenstein’s life of the question, What is the nature of the logical? 
From his point of view it is logic alone, in reflection, that can get at 
this. One can surely read the PI as addressing itself, throughout, to 
this question. The same may be said of the TLP, of course, 
although the metaphors Wittgenstein uses there are more static, as 
befits his absolute notion of simplicity in that work.60  
As we have just seen, Turing’s philosophical work recasts the 
question “What is a logical step?” insofar as what is meant is a 
formal system of logic. Turing brought that notion down to earth, 
domesticating it by drawing it into a world of human activity. 
                                                          
58 See On Certainty [hereafter “OC”] passim; esp. at §§68, 82, 375, 501. I agree with recent work of  
Kuusela (manuscript) and Grève (forthcoming), who have developed the idea of  the later 
Wittgenstein’s work as engaged with logic. This conviction shaped earlier work of  mine; for the 
thread concerned with philosophy of  logic in my own work cf. Dreben and Floyd 1991, Floyd 
1991, 2000, 2001b, 2005, 81), forthcoming a, b. 
59  Hunter 1968 forms a good starting point here, in distinguishing the narrower, wider, and 
“organic” picture of  Lebensformen. Winch 1958/2008 is the locus classicus of  the culture-wide idea, 
on which see Stern 2004. 
60 See Tejedor 2015 for discussion of  he origin of  Lebensform in the concept of  form in TLP. 
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Turing was reported to have stressed this as a philosophical ideal 
already as an undergraduate, in a 1933 lecture to the Moral Sciences 
Club (very likely after he had begun reading, if not studying, 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy): 
[On 1 December 1933] A.M. Turing read a paper on ‘Mathematics and 
Logic’. He suggested that a purely logistic view of mathematics was 
inadequate; and that mathematical propositions possessed a variety of 
interpretations, of which the logistic was merely one. Signed, R.B. 
Braithwaite.61 
What is happening in PI is a further, reflexive, deepening 
domestication of just this idea. Lebensform lies at the ultimate 
reaches of this project, just as Turing himself later admitted. 
Wittgenstein deepens Turing’s analogy with the step-by-step 
activity of a human calculator by situating this against the backdrop 
of, and embedding it within, the whirl of human life. 
On this reading Lebensformen are “to be accepted” in the same 
sense that logic is “to be accepted”. But how is that, according to 
the mature Wittgenstein? 
From the outset we must insist on a very broad conception of 
logic, one not restricted to “logistic”. As in Russell, as in Frege, 
“logic” should be understood in a primordial and encompassing 
sense. Logic is philosophy in Wittgenstein. As I shall use the term, 
it reflects activities that are irreducible, but everyday: the back and 
forth of argumentation, reasoning, reflection on such, and dialectic: 
Yes and No, but also here and there, correcting, pointing out, 
qualifying, precisifying, organizing and amalgamating and 
sharpening and dulling concepts, and so on. Given that the PI is 
filled with snapshots of such activity, this is one clear way in which 
it may be seen to be a book of, and an investigation of, logic, 
embedded in the philosophical tradition – critically, of course. 
Wittgenstein concerns himself with forms of human life in 
which dialogue and procedures are imbricated; as his work goes on, 
these become situated in a ubiquitous, evolving, indefinite 
backdrop of contingencies, necessities, procedures, habits and 
possibilities that becomes ever more thematically rich and complex. 
                                                          
61 Hodges 1999, 6. I discuss this report at length in Floyd forthcoming c. 
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As he proceeds into his most mature writings, more and more is 
encompassed within the investigation of “logic” – as if his 
relentless quest to convey logic’s ubiquity in life did not end. This is 
the point of Lebensformen. 
Now of course in Wittgenstein’s way of conceiving logic, 
arguments are not merely “sets of sentences” or “computable 
routines”, but instead specific structures that are put together, 
“chains of remarks” offered in some (living) context or other, 
whether with words, diagrams, letters, or a combination of these. 
One of his main points is that insofar as these are extracted or 
moved from their immediate homes, in life, philosophical questions 
about what the chain is are inevitably raised. 
The image of a “chain” of reasoning may certainly be found in 
other philosophical writers. In logic, it is as old as the hills. It 
appeared in the Prototractatus and in the Tractatus, and was 
subsequently developed and explored throughout Philosophical 
Remarks, The Big Typescript, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics 
and elsewhere – as well as in the Investigations, where it is even used 
in the Preface to describe units of his mature style of writing. 
Significantly, as I have said, it is with an exploration of this image of 
a chain that TS 221, the second half of the Frühfassung of the 
Investigations, ends. It is as if Wittgenstein hadn’t quite worked that 
metaphor all the way through. For that, I would like to suggest, he 
would need Lebensformen. 
As I shall put it on Wittgenstein’s behalf, forms are linked, not 
ranked. Logic in the primordial sense I am using it includes 
reasoning according to groups of considerations or beliefs that we 
have “chained” together into a certain order or structure, whether 
in ordinary language or formalizing. 
Kant often uses the idea of a “chain” [Kette] to convey both 
regressive and progressive analysis, describing a “chain inference” 
as one “consisting of several inferences that are shortened or 
combined with one another for one conclusion”,  
[For example,] Everything that thinks is simple, the soul thinks, hence 
it is simple. Everything that is simple is indivisible. The soul is simple, 
hence it is indivisible. What is indivisible is imperishable. The soul is 
indivisible, hence it is imperishable. What is imperishable persiss, the 
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soul is imperishable, hence the soul persists. – In this way I can make 
a whole chain of inferences, where I always make the conclusion into 
the premise of the following inference. 62 
In fact Kant defines syllogistic method itself as “that according 
to which a science is expounded in a chain of inferences”,63 and he 
treats “chains” of conditions, the “chain” of nature as an ordering 
of causes and effects, a “chain” of natural ends and necessities in 
the sensible world, the “chain” of mere associations in imagination, 
and so on. Reason itself has the need for intermediate links 
[Zwischenglieder] to help us orient ourselves in thinking. 64  Chains 
reflect necessities. Usage of the idea of a chain is common after 
Kant. Lewis Carroll, in his ironic book on Euclid, used it. 65  In 
Principia Mathematica Whitehead and Russell refer to “chains” of 
reasoning as they are presented as derivations from axioms, 
although they do not bring the notion of necessity into their use of 
it.66 
It is characteristic of Wittgenstein, thinking through the nature 
of the logical, to zero in on the image. In a sense he has to. It is a 
logical must. 
The chain idea is of course to be found in Frege, bound up with 
his ideal of a “gap-free” [luckenlose] presentation of reasoning 
[Schlusskette]: chains of inference hold together, are a unity, allow us 
to move step by step through the structure. In stressing the nature 
of proof in logic, Frege wrote,  
                                                          
62 Kant 1992, Jäsche Logic, §8. 
63 Kant 1992, Jäsche Logic, §118. 
64 Kant 1781/1787/1998 passim; 1783/2002 4: 269, 333, 354; 1790/2000; 1790/2000 5: 298, 430, 
435. At 1798/2002 7: 176 Kant writes that 
[Psychological laws of  association] often extends very far, and the power of  imagination often 
goes so fast from the hundredth to the thousandth that it seems we have completely skipped over 
certain imtermediate links [Zwischenglieder] in the chain of  ideas, though we have merely not been 
aware of  them. So we must often ask ourselves: “Where was I? Where did I start out in my 
conversation, and how did I reach this last point?” [Note: Therefore he who starts a social 
conversation must begin with what is near and present to him, and then gradually direct people’s 
attention to what is remote . . .] 
65 Dodgson 1879/2009. The image of  a chain does not appear in Carroll’s famous paper on the 
regress of  rule-application 1895. This is because it is being broken in this paper. 
66 Cf. Russell 1903/1938, Preface; Whitehead and Russell 1910/1927, Preface vii. In Summary of  
Part I, 87ff. he takes the work to possess two “aspects”, depending on two different points of  
view: “1. a deductive chain depending on the primitive propositions” and “2. a formal calculus”.  
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The length of a proof is not to be measured by a ruler. One can easily 
make a proof look short on paper by missing out many intermediate 
links in the chain of inference and letting much be merely indicated. 
One is generally satisfied if every step in the proof is obviously 
correct, and this is fine if one merely wants to be convinced of the 
truth of the proposition to be proved. If it is a question, however, of 
gaining an insight into the nature of this obviousness, this way of 
proceeding is not enough, but one must write down all intermediate 
steps, to let the full light of consciousness fall upon them.67 
Here, of course, Frege has an ideal of completeness in the logical 
representation of inference in mind: fully rational inference insofar 
as it is purely logical. He devised his Begriffsschrift, his presentation 
of the basic logical laws, because his requirement that we avoid 
gaps in argumentation is difficult: we need to be able to take 
reasoning in. In fact, Frege goes so far as to call it a requirement of 
reason that we must “be able to embrace all first principles in an 
Übersicht” (1884/1974, §5). The difficulty, he says, is 
. . . the prolixity of a step by step approach. Every proof that is only 
slightly complicated threatens to become monstrously long. In 
addition, the enormous variety of logical forms revealed in ordinary 
language makes it difficult to delimit a set of modes of inference that 
covers all cases and is easy to survey [leicht zu übersehen].68 
As to the idea of a “step by step” approach, Frege analyzed the 
notion of the ancestral of a relation in terms of general logical laws 
governing concepts and objects, eliminating any appeal to intuition 
or an unanalyzed idea of an indefinitely iterated procedure. In this 
way he refashioned an earlier analysis that had been framed in 
terms of Dedekind’s idea of a chain (Kette). Dedekind had used this 
notion to analyze the very idea of a recursive specification of an 
infinite set. But he believed that his specification of the natural 
numbers turned, ultimately, on “the simplest act” of “successive”, 
step-by-step creation of one member of the series from another in 
thought, and his proof of the existence of such a “system” was 
based on an argument based on appeal to a thought of himself as 
                                                          
67 Frege 1893/1903/2013, Preface VII; cf. Frege 1879/1967 III; 1884/1974 §§4,90; 1914/1979, 
200.  
68 1884/1974 §91. 
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an object. 69  Russell, persuaded in part by Wittgenstein take the 
axiom of infinity as an axiom, famously held that Dedekind’s idea 
of “free creation” has “all the advantages of theft over honest toil” 
(1920, 271).  
Wittgenstein is concerned with necessities of ordering. But in 
my view he does not revert to anything like an idea of “free 
creation” of these in PI. Instead, the dynamic, living character of his 
“chaining” of remarks is fashioned in order to investigate 
possibilities and necessities of “chaining” as such. This is what is 
distinctive about Wittgenstein’s mature rendition of the idea of a 
chain of reasoning in PI. Such a chaining evinces possibilities and 
also necessities of movement and non-movement, shortening and 
parsing, rearrangment of links, the possibility of tracing from end 
to end, backwards and forward. It is a synthesis, holding a train of 
thought together, and also analyzable into parts – which may, 
however, be substituted into by other parts, other linkings and 
chainings, other syntheses, and so on.  
For Wittgenstein the image is apposite in that logic, as he sees 
it, rests upon no metaphysical foundations of the whole, no “glue” 
of relationships, no prior ordering or features of the world, but 
instead upon our activities in fashioning links in our world, one by 
one. This does not mean that he reverts to the idea of will, or free 
creation, at the basis. Instead, we are binders, working against a 
universal backdrop, a whirl of life in which procedures, routines, 
chainings, have already been imbricated. Logic is concerned with 
establishing and interweaving procedures and possible procedures, 
as well as plumbing the limits of certain kinds of procedures. 
Insofar it can come to be indefinitely imbricated and impressed, 
ubiquitously, in lives with speech and language. 
Now Wittgenstein always thought of logic as a matter of 
presenting agreements and disagreements (Übereinstimmungen, nicht-
Übereinstimmungen) of possibilities and necessities, one with others, 
                                                          
69 Dedekind 1888/1996, see 768. For analysis see Sieg and Schlimm 2005, Sieg 2013, 46, Floyd 
2013b, 1023ff. Russell discussed Dedekind’s notion at length in 1903/1938, so that Wittgenstein 
would have known it from there, at least. We do not know whether he ever read Dedekind directly. 
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others with others, and so on.70 For him an articulate chain (later, a 
language-game, or a rule that is followed) draws out aspects of 
thoughts, given in fields of necessity, contingency, and possibility 
that we can take in; it does not (only) directly depict what is the 
case. Such aspects are erected, taken in, and then may be proceeded 
with, reconfigured, generalized on, and so on. The aspects are not 
merely “subjective”, even if they are response-dependent in a 
number of senses. Instead, they show themselves forth, are there to 
be seen, to be discovered – not directly, as objects are perceived, 
but in the way that a chain of reasoning may be taken in, seen, 
ordered, surveyed. 71  Of course, Wittgenstein never analyzed 
possibility or necessity or reduced it to other terms. Instead, he 
takes us to be capable of “seeing” it in the workings of logic.  
Now Frege too spoke of “aspects” in connection with logical 
analysis. He took generalization through reflection on function-
argument structure to reveal “aspects” of thoughts, thereby 
emphasizing the organic, multiply interlocking character of his 
logic’s handling of generality in comparison to e.g. Boole’s. This is 
evinced in the multiple analyzability of, e.g., “Caesar crossed the 
Rubicon” into “x crossed the Rubicon”, “x crossed y”, 
“Φ(Caesar)”, and so on, determining the structure of multiple 
generalizations that are possible.72  
But for Wittgenstein, unlike for Frege, such rephrasing draws in 
chains (orderings, fields) in which possibility and necessity show 
forth, come to life. Such chains or orderings of remarks allow for 
“intermediate” links among cases through comparison, substitution 
or rearrangement of parts (e.g., in form series; but more broadly on 
which see PI 122, 161): all the activities of ordering that make such 
a chain Übersichtlich, or surveyable. What are substituted are 
procedures, rather than, as in the pre-Frege tradition, terms, or, in 
                                                          
70 Cf. TLP 2.22, 4.42, 4.4, discussed with a stress on modality in Shieh 2014 and Shieh manuscript. 
I discuss the first appearance of  the idea of  drawing “features” out of  a “puzzle picture” in 
Wittgenstein’s wartime notebooks in Floyd 2010.  
71 In Floyd forthcoming a I draw out the notion of  “aspect” in Wittgenstein’s thought, parting 
ways with an aestheticizing and/or phenomenological sense of  “aspects” as primarily experiential 
or “subjective” (cf. Floyd 2000, Baz 2000, 2010, Mulhall 1990, 2010). I think aspect should be 
characterized, like “showing” in terms of  the grammatical “middle voice”, discussed in Narboux 
2014: it spans action and passion, response and imposition, showing itself  in our activities.  
72 Frege 1891/1997, 5; 1892/1997, 27. 
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Frege, ways of generalizing over concepts and objects. In 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy all this takes place against an 
explicitly living backdrop – after 1937 Lebensformen – which are 
themselves brought into Wittgenstein’s remarks by the imagination, 
the form of life, the logical and reflective capacities of the reader 
(as logic was also in the activity of the reader of TLP, though there 
there was not yet a significant role for Lebensformen to play). 
Thus even in later Wittgenstein “logic” does comprise iterative, 
repeatable, reproducible procedures, routines that begin and 
terminate, that are well-founded (in that they begin somewhere), that 
are designed for a purpose, that may be broken off, amalgamated, 
communicated, interwoven, and shared. There is simplicity. Logic is 
still “formal”, without being “formalist”. Frege was right to criticize 
the formalists, from Wittgenstein’s point of view. But he was 
wrong to equate the form/content distinction with that between 
sign and signified.73 Wittgenstein “logicizes” Frege by way of his 
own organic notion of an aspect, using it to reconceive of multiple 
generality in terms of step-by-step procedures framed by language 
in logic.74 The notion of aspect, like that of form, was always a modal 
notion, an idea of ordered necessity of reasoning in Wittgenstein, 
and in PI it becomes morphologized, living. 
Wittgenstein’s turn toward Lebensform, possibilities of life-
structuring in life, would only have been reinforced by Turing’s 
drawing a comparison between human computational activity and 
the idea of a machine blueprint into the foundations of formal 
logic. But it pushes deeper into philosophy itself, into the project of 
exploring and expressing logos in general in logos. In his discussion of 
aspects Wittgenstein draws in and presses forward what I have 
elsewhere called his “Master Simile”, a simile that also occurred in 
the TLP: a comparison between logical features of what we say 
(“internal” or “formal” relations among these) and facial features, 
aspects of a human face that wears a certain look (happiness, grief, 
etc.) and so is more than just the set, or sum, of its elements.75 Such 
                                                          
73 Cf. Frege 1891/1997, Mühlhölzer 2008. 
74 Cf. Frege’s use of  aspect in 1891/1997, 5; 1892/1997, 27. 
75  TLP 4.1221. I discuss this simile, with attention to Wittgenstein’s development, in Floyd 
forthcoming a, building on Diamond 1991 and Putnam 1999 lecture 3. 
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aspects highlight or bring to life the relations a face bears to other 
looks and faces, i.e., it opens up a field of procedural necessities 
and possibilities of comparison, agreement, disagreement, 
similarity,  difference, and so on. 
Wittgenstein took this Master Simile very seriously throughout 
his life. And in PI it serves to deepen and extend Turing’s snapshot 
comparison. Its methodological import is that in order to become 
acquainted with logical, formal features of what we say and think, we 
must work by looking, responding, querying, comparing, and so on 
– just as we do with a living human face (or even a picture-face) in 
life itself.  
Wittgenstein’s notion of acquaintance, of recognition [erkennen], 
is an everyday notion, woven into the notions of aspect and of 
familiarity; it is nothing less than the sense in which, by looking, 
listening, probing, discussing and responding, we become 
acquainted with a particular person, emotion, proof, perspective, 
look, and so on. This is Wittgenstein’s altogether worthy 
replacement for Russell’s alternative construal of the notions of 
acquaintance and aspect lying at the bottom of our appreciation of 
logical form. In Russell we have direct, incorrigible mental contact 
with simples, with aspects of things, with our own selves, with 
logical forms. In Wittgenstein such acquaintance only appears with 
coaxing, reflection, procedure, listening, and discussion: with 
methodical, dynamic, concerted interaction and a drawing out of 
spaces of contrast, of possibilities.76 
Life and reality are to be appreciated in linkings of aspects and 
in reshuffling of simples, philosophy in “chains of remarks” that 
may be broken off, revisited, resituated. In this sense the problem 
of other minds is far deeper than that of the external world, as 
Cavell argued long ago (1979/1999). But, in the end, perhaps the 
one problem mirrors the other, analogically speaking, as both are 
reduced to the problem of ordering and chaining in life. We bind 
ourselves to ourselves and to one another, in thought, deed and 
word. We bind ourselves to routines, to words with words. When 
Wittgenstein wrote that all knowledge in the end bases itself on 
                                                          
76 For an extended treatment of  this see Floyd forthcoming a. 
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(gründet sich) acknowledgment (Anerkennung), he was still, after all, 
echoing Frege.77  
In what follows I will run through the five occurrences of 
Lebensform in PI with these thoughts in mind. To keep my reading 
of Turing in play, I will keep philosophy of mind very much to the 
side. For me, the second, rougher part of PI will always remain 
“Part II”, though I am aware that it has been renamed “Philosophy 
of Psychology: A Fragment” in the new 2009 edition, and I 
concede to “PPF” referencing and section divisions below. Neither 
Turing nor Wittgenstein are given proper credit for being 
philosophers of logic, first and foremost, it seems to me. To be 
sure, they were both were concerned to extrude mysterious, inner 
mental acts from the foundations; like Frege, Wittgenstein was 
always on guard, when a difficult question is asked about what 
something is, not to invent a something, anything you please, to fill 
the role. But then philosophy of mind is an application, and less 
fundamental to what they did, than their recasting of the notion of 
logic. 
4.2 PI 19: Form of Life and Logical Aspects, not Culture and 
not Grammar 
PI 19. It is easy to imagine a language consisting only of orders and 
reports in battle. – Or a language consisting only of questions and 
expressions for answering Yes and No – and countless other things. – 
And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life 
[Lebensform]. 
As part of our depiction of Lebensform as logical, it is important 
to stress that Wittgenstein’s use of this notion is intended to replace 
an undifferentiated notion of culture, broadening and deepening it. 
The notion of culture [Kultur] does not appear in PI at all. Kultur 
was expurgated already from the Big Typescript and the remarks on 
Frazer’s Golden Bough – surely something intentional. This 
expurgation is reflected in the progress of Wittgenstein’s thought 
we have characterized above. For the places where he still uses 
culture in The Brown Book and in RFM I are juxtaposed with remarks 
                                                          
77 OC 378. 
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that use the notions of logical proceeding and/or life to clarify those 
uses. These remarks draw in broadly logical features of imagined or 
longstanding historical culture, i.e., “natural history” involving 
recognized procedures: differing uses of color terms than ours; 
calculation with figures in the sand, as drawn from the ancient 
paradigms of procedure in Babylonia; a procedure in which there is 
taken to be a definitive end to the series of “natural” numbers.78 
No particular culture figures in the Investigations except its own, 
as Cavell has said (1988). In “the darkness of this time” in which it 
was written, it wasn’t clear there was such. Following Cavell’s lead, 
we may say that the “culture of voice” in the Investigations explores 
the possibilities of culture, not the actual, or even an imagined, world. 
It is schematic, not bourgeois. It is concerned with the very idea of an 
attempt to lay the foundation for any possible state, but it does not, 
like the bourgeois, attempt to shore up this state.  
Here I echo a remark Wittgenstein made already in 1931 about 
Ramsey: he labelled Ramsey a “bourgeois” thinker, because Ramsey 
insisted on shoring up the laws of classical logic in the face of what 
he called the “Bolshevik” menace of intuitionism (cf. Ramsey 
1926).79 Wittgenstein, by contrast, was interested in the foundation 
of any possible state, not the actual one. Here we must remember the 
generality of Turing’s analysis of a “step” in a formal system: it 
bypasses the argument between classical and non-classical logic. 
For it is no part of our general notion of following a rule in a system 
that we follow classical, as opposed to intuitionistic, rules, or that 
we use what we call the “natural” numbers, as opposed to “1, 2, 
many”.  
Though Wittgenstein writes about Kultur in letters to 
acquaintances – and the notion was very important to his self-
conception (as in the drafted Foreword printed with Philosophical 
Remarks (PR)) – his mature philosophy is pursued without reliance 
on, or presuppositions about, this. His unwillingness to so rely was 
                                                          
78 BB, Brown Book §3, 134 RFM I 153, II 27 (1938).  
79 MS 112 70v, 1 November 1931. This remark occurs in the midst of  very interesting discussions 
of  the boundaries of  mathematics (using an Euler diagram) and a quote from Lichtenberg: 
“Unsere ganze Philosophie ist Berichtigung des Sprachgebrauchs, also, die Berichtigung einer 
Philosophie, und zwar der allgemeinsten”. [Our whole philosophy is a correction of  the use of  
language, therefore, a correction of  a philosophy, that is, the most general one.] 
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already made quite explicit in his initial lecture at Cambridge in 
Michaelmas 1930. Stating that there has been a “kink” in the 
development of human thought, he held that the “style of 
thinking” has changed, the “nimbus” of greatness has been lost to 
philosophy since the time of Galileo, for a “method” has been 
found (he meant here science or, more generally, analysis). Now 
“for the first time” there can be “skillful” philosophers, but the 
price is a “general tendency” of the age to “take away possibilities 
of expression: which is characteristic of an age without a culture” 
(WCLM 5:2, p. 107-8). This, of course, reflects Wittgenstein’s 
middle, hybrid view of simplicity, in which the idea of an 
archipelago of calculi reigned ascendent. 
But what is interesting is that even here he associates the 
presence of a “culture” with “possibilities of expression”. Not 
everything may be said or expressed or meant at any arbitrary time, 
but what would be central to the work of logic (of philosophy) are 
the modalities, the possibilities of possibilities, opening up 
possibilities of expression, and not the facts per se.  
My point here is that the notion of culture cannot be used 
without loss to gloss Wittgenstein’s idea of Lebensform, it is very 
much the other way around. Moreover, when Wittgenstein says 
that to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life (PI 19) he is 
struggling to embed the notion of language itself in a wider 
purview, stressing the open-endedness of his conception.  
As to “value”: Wert does not appear in the PI either, and 
“normative” only once, in the reminiscence about Wittgenstein’s 
conversation with Ramsey about the idea of logic as a “normative 
science” (PI 81). This expresses a debt to Ramsey’s pragmatic, 
Peircean philosophy of logic, not a criticism of the idea of 
normativity in logic per se. 80  But there is an important contrast 
between Ramsey and Wittgenstein at stake. Ramsey wanted to 
investigate the actual state of things, beliefs, and persons (he was a 
“bourgeois” thinker). Whereas Wittgenstein wanted to try to 
schematize and carry through an investigation of all of their possible 
orderings. For this reason, in connection with the “normativity” of 
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logic, it is quite important to stress that Lebensformen do not have to 
do with “value” as such, or “truth” as such. These notions lie in 
what we say and do, but in a step-by-step procedure as such there 
is a certain neutrality. This is precisely why particular routines are 
not neutral, cannot be carved away from what we do: values show 
forth, are expressed, in that we follow them, argue over them, 
surrender them, and so on. 
As I have put it elsewhere, aspects (visible and communicable, 
reproducible ranges of features (of form), in living arrangements 
(configurations that we have put together) are orthogonal to value.81 
They may intersect with it, be bound to or interlocked or 
interwoven with value, and surely aspects, once fashioned and seen, 
may make claims on us, set us off on trains of inference, and so 
shape our perspectives. But aspects as such have a moment of 
schematicity, of possibility rather than actuality, just as logic does.82 
In terms of the duck-rabbit figure (PPI xi 118): If it’s a rabbit, then 
this is an ear, and that is a nose, that is a rabbit’s eye, and so on and 
so forth: a whole world of internal (logical) relations comes to life 
as we embed the figure in our lives. But if it’s a duck, then this is a 
beak, and that is a duck’s eye, and so on and so forth. This is part of 
the role to be played by Lebensformen. 
In Cavell’s The Claim of Reason (1979/1999) progress was made 
on the notion of Lebensform: in his hands it is neither treated 
narrowly as a “language-game” nor widely as a whole human 
backdrop of agreement holding anyway among those who speak, 
nor as a culture. Instead, Cavell leans on and develops the idea with 
more sophistication, subtlety, and depth. He associates the notion 
with interpretation, but also dailiness and criteria: shared and 
communicable aspects of our ordinary lives and typical procedures 
with words (criteria), and, most of all, with the “ordinary” 
understood as a field of philosophical departure and return, a twin 
of scepticism. 
Cavell thereby brings the broad notion of “logic” back to the 
Investigations in the sense I am articulating it here, and I regard my 
                                                          
81 Floyd forthcoming a. 
82 Compare WVC 116 on “value”. 
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historical situating of PI as an elaboration, rather than a correction, 
of his reading.83 The “ordinary”, the simple, as I have called it here, 
is colorful and dynamic, contested and accepted, an open and 
ubiquitous field for life, for philosophy. Of course, it may be 
rejected, or felt as limited, and then, with our everyday procedures 
shunned, scepticism may raise its head. The need for an “outside” 
of logic as a quest for Luftleben, life’s breathing air, must return to 
its environment in utterance as well as procedure (cf. PI 102). What 
is thereby shown to fall to the side in Wittgenstein is a certain 
conception of unlogical “gas”, empty structures of air [Luftgebäude]. 
Cavell’s idea of a culture of “voicing” inscribed in the Investigations 
(further articulated as Lebensform in Laugier 2015) gives us the right 
orientation for addressing culture such as it is or might be from the 
perspective of PI. After all, the chains of remarks in PI are nothing 
but investigations of possible voicings of thought. 
We might say that Wittgenstein’s “forms of life” appear in PI as 
voices, orchestrations of possible forms of life, or journeyings of 
voicing with aspects. To see Lebensform as logical is to regard the 
notion as a necessary outcome of thinking through the idea of 
what, in general, calculation-in-a-logic is, a proper and inevitable 
foundational setting, a logical gloss on the essence of essence, an 
analysis of logical analysis as such.  
But now I imagine an objection: does not Wittgenstein replace 
the notion of logic (or “logical syntax”) with that of grammar? Is 
this not a generalization on his part, as it were getting past an 
obsession with “logic”? 
“Grammar” is most often applied to particular expressions in 
PI, usually words, verbs, or brief phrases; a grammatical 
“investigation”. But it is also connected with the kind of object an 
object is, with possibilities of phenomena (PI 53, 90; cf. PPF xi 
186). Getting to see this may involve us in analysis of “forms” of 
expression, Wittgenstein says – though there is no final analysis by 
the time of PI (PI 90-91). Grammar is evinced in an exploration of 
                                                          
83 In this sense, Cavell’s reading of  Wittgenstein is not “dark”, as is argued by Moyal-Sharrock 
forthcoming: it encompasses both light and dark “modernity”, is in that sense neutral, shows us 
logical certainty, necessity, as it is. 
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our criteria, which show us the place of a concept: possibilities of 
use, not the actualities of particular objects or uses per se.  
In Wittgenstein, grammatical explorations are, in my broad 
sense, logical: they reveal aspects of thoughts, words, sentences, 
states of affairs, ourselves, and so on. For they open up fields of 
possibility and necessity that are made, in logic, alive to us. If there 
is ever anything going on analogous to therapy in the later 
Wittgenstein, it involves not simply liberation through talking per se, 
but this only in seeing and taking in and comparing and living with 
real possibilities and necessities of expressing, possible (imagined) 
modes or forms of life. 
By using “grammar” Wittgenstein is making a particular sort of 
move in relation to the tradition. He is holding, not terribly novelly, 
that grammatical explorations are part of logic: Aristotle had said as 
much. But he is not replacing logic with “grammatical investigations” 
only, for their own sake. This idea is – unfortunately – encouraged 
by the finally published form of PI, which is unfinished. This form 
has lent to Wittgenstein’s philosophical legacy too great a focus on 
language as such, as if he was no longer really focussing on the 
logical. But by focussing on the everyday, by saying that to imagine 
a language is to imagine a Lebensform, he is nevertheless clarifying 
the nature of logic, as the context in which he framed his ideas 
makes clear. 
After the mathematicization of logic in a language post-Peirce 
and Frege, mathematicians such as Hardy and logician-
philosophers such as Carnap stressed that ordinary parlance is 
vague, mushy, unrigorous, a seat of endless and fruitless 
argumentation. Hardy and Littlewood called it “gas”, “provisional 
nonsense” that would be dispensed with in proper mathematics.84 
Carnap recommended the replacement of ordinary phraseology 
with the construction of formalized languages, axiomatic systems. 
But, as Turing argued in 1933, the idea of “logistic” is but one 
interpretation of mathematics among many, and not a privileged 
one. PI expunges the whole idea of “gas”, recovering the 
                                                          
84 Cf. Littlewood 1926, Preface and Hardy 1929, 18, discussed by Wittgenstein and Turing in 
Lecture I of  LFM. I treat the significance of  these metaphors in Floyd forthcoming c. 
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“foundations” through analogies, the metaphors, exploration of 
nonsense, and so on. It is a philosophy built along lines Turing 
explored and explicitly discussed with Wittgenstein in LFM (see 
Lecture 1). 
Wittgenstein wanted to emphasize to mathematicians, logicians 
and philosophers that how we use words in everyday life (including 
in ordinary mathematics, outside logistic) is inseparable and not to 
be dismissed from foundational talk. A philosophical investigation 
of ordinary “phraseology” is not merely “decorative” or aesthetic, it 
is an essential part of the work.85 We have seen Turing putting this 
idea into action in his analysis and resolution of the 
Entscheidungsproblem, as well as his early talk to the Moral Sciences 
club (see Braithwaite’s report, quoted above). Turing self-
consciously domesticated the sublime picture of mathematics as a 
“miraculous machine” that Hardy had used to explain Hilbert’s 
idea of an Entscheidungsproblem, thereby bringing it down to earth.86 
(Gödel too held that to get the foundations right we had to go 
outside of mathematics, to philosophy, ploughing through everyday 
life – but this is another story.87) 
This is why much of Wittgenstein’s method turns on exploring 
what we are actually inclined to say about what we might possibly 
say or do (or not do). Yet his quarry is (the nature of) logic, not 
proper word-use, or particular concepts, or chatting per se, even if 
these too would receive re-thinking in light of his later philosophy. 
In PI the distinction between “prose” and “proof”, a characteristic 
of his “middle” period philosophy of mathematics, becomes 
permeable, though still able to be drawn locally, as he comes to see 
the ubiquity, complexity and fluidity of reflection, both on and in 
“prose” and “proof”.88 In the handling of “first” steps in the early 
                                                          
85 This is the explicit topic discussed by Wittgenstein and Turing in lecture I of  LFM; cf. Floyd 
forthcoming c. 
86 Hardy 1929, 18. 
87 Floyd and Kanamori 2016 outline some of  Gödel’s 1942-3 philosophical reactions to Wittgenstein 
and Russell. 
88 Kienzler and Grève 2016 helpfully note the permeability of  the distinction between “prose” and 
“proof ” in Wittgenstein’s later writings. However they ground their interpretation of  
Wittgenstein’s 1937 remarks on Gödel on the evolution of  Wittgenstein’s thought about language 
per se (cf. pp. 85ff). This leaves philosophy of  logic out of  the picture. Moreover, they attribute 
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version of PI (FF) the manuscript ends with the image of a chain, 
still not satisfactorily worked through. This working through would 
preoccupy Wittgenstein through 1939-40, when he was writing 
RFM III – manuscripts produced, not accidentally I think, after 
Turing had attended his Cambridge lectures on the foundations of 
mathematics in the spring of 1939 (LFM).89  
4.3. PI 23-25: Natural History and Logic, Regressive 
Analysis, Concatenation 
PI 23. But how many kinds of sentence are there? Say assertion, 
question and command? – There are countless kinds; countless different 
kinds of use of all the things we call “signs”, “words”, “sentences”. 
And this diversity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new 
types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into 
existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten. (We can get 
a rough picture of this from the changes in mathematics.)  
The word “language-game” is used here to emphasize the fact that the 
speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.  
Consider the variety of language-games in the following examples, and 
in others:  
Giving orders, and acting on them --- 
Describing an object by its appearance, or by its measurements – 
Constructing an object from a description (a drawing) – 
Reporting an event – 
Speculating about the event – 
Forming and testing a hypothesis – 
Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams – 
Making up a story; and reading one – 
Acting in a play – 
Singing rounds – 
Guessing riddles – 
Cracking a joke; telling one – 
Solving a problem in applied arithmetic – 
Translating from one language into another – 
Requesting, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.  
                                                                                                                                                                        
philosophical views to Gödel that, I believe, are in error, and misdescribe the “situation” in 
“ordinary mathematics” at the time (cf. Kanamori and Floyd 2016, Floyd forthcoming c). 
89 On RFM III see the magisterial commentary Mühlhölzer 2010, reviewed in Floyd 2015. Floyd 
forthcoming c comments on Wittgenstein and Turing’s discussions in LFM. 
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It is interesting to compare the diversity of the tools of language and 
of the ways they are used, the diversity of kinds of word and sentence, 
with what logicians have said about the structure of language. (This 
includes the author of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.) … 
PI 25. It is sometimes said: animals do not talk because they lack the 
mental abilities. And this means: “They do not think, and that is why 
they do not talk.” But – they simply do not talk. Or better: they do not 
use language – if we disregard the most primitive forms of language. – 
Giving orders, asking questions, telling stories, having a chat, are as 
much a part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing. 
Wittgenstein counts “chatting” [plauschen] explicitly among those 
most pervasive elements of our “natural history” in the Investigations 
(PI 25): this is the culmination of the first occurrences of Lebensform 
(in PI 19, 23). These take off from the metaphor of the city as an 
evolving organized whole, its “downtown” heart centered on 
winding, ancient parts rather than straight-running superhighways 
(PI 18). The PI is not just chatting, however. It comprises 
argumentation, a lot of it – something I have found those who write 
about Wittgenstein’s philosophical “methods” too often 
underemphasizing – as if they are primarily directed at the nature of 
proper language use and meaning.  
There is a difference between chatting, requesting, insisting, and 
so on, and arguing and genuinely reflecting on that. Part of 
Wittgenstein’s philosophical aim is to teach us to characterize, 
negotiate, recognize, and utilize in our own ways these complexes 
of differences rightly. Philosophy turns on nothing more, and 
nothing less, than developing an ear, a nose, and a pair of eyes for 
the difference between chatting and arguing, questioning and 
supporting, qualifying and stating, analogizing and speaking 
literally, negating, and misunderstanding. All of this belongs to the 
activity of logic, as do all the procedural elements given in the list of 
language-games given in PI 23. 
Wittgenstein suggests that we can get a “rough picture” of all of 
this from looking at changes in mathematics (PI 23). We have 
already broached this idea in looking at Turing. But perhaps a wider 
look around will help. In the development of mathematics we may 
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see certain earmarks of the conception of the logical that they are 
forwarding. 
The conception springs from the very idea of analysis itself, as 
embodied in the “regressive” method of presenting a body of 
mathematical body of knowledge in axiomatic form. Here a certain 
dialectic or tension always existed between the way a proof is 
presented, and its raison d’être. This is very ancient, a living character 
of the axiomatic tradition in mathematics as well as the analytic 
tradition in philosophy. It inheres in the image of a chain of 
reasoning, which may be traced forwards or backwards, considered 
as a synthesis or as an analysis into parts. 
Book I of Euclid’s Elements serves to illustrate. (Wittgenstein 
wrote much about Euclid. 90 ) It ends at Proposition 47, the 
Pythagorean Theorem. That is, in a certain sense, the raison d’être or 
goal of Book I. But the presentation, as so often in mathematics, is 
written backwards. The method of presentation is: Given this, you 
can get the theorem. Given that, you can get this. And so on. The 
moves are from synthesis to analysis and again back to synthesis. 
Proofs, analyses, regressions, reductions to givens, are written 
backwards. So Hobbes read Book I of Euclid’s Elements, if we can 
believe Aubrey’s Lives.91 There is a systematic “backwardness” to be 
taken in. The “givens” are the beginning and the end, the 
interlinked chain as a whole, and also the particular linkings. 
Necessity appears, until it ends somewhere (not in self-evident 
“givens” or “aspects of acquaintance” in Russell’s sense, according 
to Wittgenstein). Sufficiency appears to work frontward: Given this, 
you can get that; Given that, you can get the next, and so on. But we 
use this, in fact, to stich our way back to the “givens” or simples. 
Euclid says that the “givens” are “data”, the “givens” at the front. 
                                                          
90  For example, see BT pp. 105ff, 325-334. For discussion see Floyd 1995, 2000, Floyd and 
Mühlhölzer manuscript.  
91 Stillwell 2010, 2.1, 18, quoting Aubrey 1680/1898: 
He was 40 years old before he looked on Geometry; which happened accidentally. Being in a 
Gentleman’s Library, Euclid’s Elements lay open, and ’twas the 47 El. libri I. He read the 
Proposition. By G – sayd he (he would now and then sweare an emphaticall Oath by way of  
emphasis) this is impossible! So he reads the Demonstration of  it, which referred him back to 
such a Proposition; which proposition he read. That referred him back to another, which he 
also read . . . that at last he was demonstratively convinced of  that trueth. This made him in 
love with Geometry.  
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But that is only a metaphorical way of thinking about the 
procedure.  
Reading forwards, the uninitiated reader may be told once, at 
the outset, “This is where we are headed: here is the goal of the 
journey”. She may be reminded of this from time to time. But it is 
the journey, not the destination that counts. We mostly do not see, 
moving through as readers, where we are. The end is not yet 
chained, bound, in a series of procedures we can take in. The 
connection to the end may appear to lie somewhere underground 
in hidden machinery.92 Maybe we will never see the whole as a 
chain (a chain is visible, surveyable, perhaps through winding it up, 
running through it, link by link). Perhaps a piece of computational 
machinery, to which we offload, can help us to take it all in, archive 
and arrange it all, to see, take in, and form the necessities and 
possibilities in another way. Information requires formation, after 
all. But algorithms are not neutral: they inhere in, shape, swim, in 
our world of procedures, as Wittgenstein and Turing stressed. 
Of course, these images of “forwards” and “backwards” are 
insufficient, ultimately metaphorical. A chain has no direction or 
orientation (unlike, say, an arrow or a pointing finger). In the 
Elements Book I, the aim is the composition and activity and 
arrangements, the chains of aspects themselves. The important 
thing is the possibility of this. By means of it, the Pythagorean 
Theorem is not merely a statement or headline. It is transformed 
into a living face, mathematics with depth. In writings generated in 
1939-40 – just after Turing had sat in on his Cambridge lectures 
LFM – Wittgenstein remarked that mathematics is a “colorful 
mix”, likening it to a tapestry that we weave with filaments (of 
procedures), rather than a chaotic, unsystematic thing. 93 Moreover, 
he emphasizes that we discover aspects, whereas we invent 
techniques.94 We might say that aspects come out of our framing of 
procedures (of proof or calculation). 
                                                          
92 As in RFM I 106, App. II 3; cf. Floyd 1995, 2010, 2012a. 
93 RFM III 46-48. The German is “buntes Gemisch”. I follow Mühlhölzer 2010 in rejecting the 
Anscombe original translation of  “motley”, which makes it sound like a jester’s costume. Cf. Floyd 
2015, 262.  
94 This contrast appeared before 1939, but is returned to in the later writings. Compare BT 134, 
RFM III 46ff, PI 119, 124-9, 133, 222, 262, 387, 536, PPF 130 and Floyd forthcoming a. 
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We are forwarding a picture of the PI as belonging to logic in 
the ancient sense: to philosophy, demanding as it does the 
representation of logos itself. From this panoramic point of view, 
the PI’s way of thinking must be self-standing and alone competent 
to judge its own workings, as well as fluid and ubiquitous, 
embeddable everywhere: an endlessly interesting, endlessly 
articulable way of aiming to pursue – and also learn how to break 
off from – certain kinds of perfection, ordering, in thinking. 
Wittgenstein offers us an orchestration of voice: exemplary 
arrangements and linkings of forms or possibilities of voicings, 
harmonies, disharmonies, agreements and disagreements. These are 
compositions as opposed simply to chats, although chatting there is 
and – one would like to say – so it has been and ever must be.  
There is a dim but distinct echo here of certain Tractarian ideas, 
but now subsumed into the mature way of thinking about the 
simples. This is why Wittgenstein practices his mature method of 
comparing his mature with his earlier views. He has not left behind 
or contradicted the idea that there is no special subject matter of 
logic. Logical signs still offer punctuation marks for possible 
thoughts, not reference to the constituents of senses (TLP 5.4611). 
What there are in logic are chains of interlockings of possible 
thought-trains. And logic’s conception of thought is itself a 
conception of expressions of agreement and disagreement with 
possibilities, though now the truth-table way of clarifying this is no 
longer privileged. 
As reflection and argumentation and chatting are pursued, they 
gradually assume the dress of further articulation. Such belongs to 
our “natural history”. As we know, “logic” is eventually explored in 
the PI in relation to the imposition and concocting of possible 
procedures or routines, and, more specifically, “calculi”.95 Such was 
                                                          
95 Pichler draws on a deep understanding of  Wittgenstein Nachlass when he emphasizes (2016) 
that the “calculus” and “human” conceptions of  language use vied with one another in a 
complicated, interwoven manner throughout Wittgenstein’s life, one sometimes ascendant, then 
the other, neither wholly supporting or occluding the other. I am proposing that “forms” partake 
of  both aspects. This reading is at odds with a straight-line progressivist interpretation on which 
Wittgenstein replaces a “calculus” conception of  meaning derived from Frege, Russell and the 
Tractatus with an anthropological or ethnological conception, of  which an open-ended, 
interlocking series of  language-games, conceived as constituting “forms of  life” or “cultures”, are 
the expression (cf. Hacker 2015). 
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logic’s own history of formalization, our natural history with it. Let 
us consider that next. 
In a quite ordinary sense the notions of “juxtaposition” and 
“concatenation” – “chaining” – are ancient and fundamental to the 
primordial idea of logic I have characterized above. Certainly such 
phenomena of chaining are strewn across the history of 
mathematics, of logic, of alphabets and writing. Philosophers 
recognized this long ago, beginning at least with Plato, who worried 
about the suppression of human voice in the face of writing. In 
TLP the idea of an elementary proposition, construed by 
Wittgenstein in terms of an articulate picture used to say how 
things are, embeds the idea. Wittgenstein’s idea of ultimate 
simplicity, the basis of the space of all possible things to be said, 
turns on the idea of simple objects configured in chain, fixed in a 
determinate ordering as an articulate whole, a tableau vivant fixed by 
concatenation of symbols (TLP 2.03, 4.22, 4.0311). Wittgenstein 
has to work hard in the TLP to get past the use of a picture to say 
how things are, to get on to the idea that the same picture may be 
used to say how things are and how they are not, so that the use of 
the picture itself can bring to life logical form, a possibility of 
presenting alternative possibilities, ultimately within the whole 
world of possibilities as such.  
The Babylonians appear initially to have put “7” next to “5” in 
juxtaposition to “add” and get twelve, a kind of fusion of 
constituents in which order is irrelevant (twelve sheep are “made 
up of” seven and another five). That was surely a procedure (so is 
“one, two, many”). Yet getting to the very notion of concatenation 
(“chaining” or “stringing”), essential for getting in turn to 
routinization and iterable calculation, and, further indefinite iteration, 
took large steps. The Babylonians were able to get to an 
alphabetical system (after some centuries) with their base 60 
notation, thereby folding in what belongs in general to writing and 
ordering in the sense fundamental for any civilization, logical 
proceduring, or language. Concatenation draws in, is, ordering: 
perhaps first a bidirectional linear order of symbols, and then, later 
on, other forms of linear and partial order. The decimal notation, 
and “+”, came much later on, as did later still the more and more 
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general combinatorial issues (of partitions of numbers, of possible 
arrangements of sheep and officers of different ranks, of a system 
of recursion equations, of the ordered pair, and so on). As Otto 
Neugebauer, the great historian of ancient mathematics with whom 
Wittgenstein shared a pencil while in Monte Cassino once wrote, 
What is often overlooked and cannot be sufficiently emphasized is the 
terrible difficulty and slowness of the development of the very 
simplest fundamental mathematical concepts, first of all of a genuine 
computational technique.96  
It is a remarkable fact that the regressive method itself only 
rendered a clear notion of set (unordered elements put together, 
ensembles, as the French have it), thereby reintroducing the ancient 
idea of static joining, so late in the game – in fact during 
Wittgenstein’s early lifetime. Here is a “given” gotten to through the 
regressive method, then capable of synthesizing an enormous 
playing field for mathematics in set theory. It was not one 
Wittgenstein particularly liked playing in, admittedly. But we can 
see why. For it obliterates, in its very nature, the aspectual, chain-
like level of conceiving procedures, putting together in orderings. Thus it 
obliterates Wittgenstein’s central data of logic, just as it had for 
Frege before him. It also invites in by the back door the whiff of 
both absolute and relative conceptions of simplicity, a one-sided, 
undynamic picture, in which forms, once again, are ranked and not 
merely linked.97 
Once concatenation is in place, eventually notions of substitution 
and occurrences of a sign require hard thinking through in logic. As a 
matter of fact, these were the very issues with which Wittgenstein 
and Russell strugged in 1913.98 Substitution was only formulated as 
a separate principle of logic in the twentieth century – a crucial 
preliminary to Gödel’s 1931 paper on incompleteness and also 
                                                          
96 1935-37, vol 3, 80. On Wittgenstein and Neugebauer see cf. Swerdlow 1993. I am indebted here 
to Kanamori (manuscript) for further discussion of  the long history of  proof. For Wittgenstein 
on Euler’s thirty-six officers problem and the bridges of  Königsberg, see Floyd 2012a, 240.  
97  On Wittgenstein’s crabby, but not utterly useless remarks on set theory, see Floyd and 
Mühlhölzer manuscript. 
98 Cf. Russell 1913/1984. 
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Turing’s “On computable numbers” (1936/7). 99  Each of these 
“chainings” instituted new “forms of life”, and created and grew 
newfangled calculative behaviors on the part of humans, at the 
individual and the civilizational, cultural levels.100  
4.4 PI 240-242: Agreement in Judgments, Scaffolding 
PI 240. Disputes do not break out (among mathematicians, say) over 
the question of whether or not a rule has been followed. People don’t 
come to blows over it, for example. This belongs to the scaffolding 
[Gerüst] from which our language operates (for example, yields 
descriptions).  
241. “So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true 
and what is false?”  
– What is true or false is what human beings say; and it is in their 
language that human beings agree. This is agreement [Übereinstimmung] 
not in opinions, but rather in form of life [Lebensform].  
242. It is not only agreement in definitions, but also (odd as it may 
sound) agreement in judgements that is required for communication 
by means of language. This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so. 
– It is one thing to describe methods of measurement, and another to 
obtain and state results of measurement. But what we call “measuring” 
is in part determined by a certain constancy in results of measurement. 
I take it that with the image of “scaffolding” Wittgenstein is 
revising Hilbert’s idea of logic as part of the Fachwerk (half-timber 
structure) of a theory101 by making it dynamic in our varieties of its 
uses.  
Hilbert had written to Frege that  
                                                          
99 C.I. Lewis identified substitution as a separate logical principle in his 1918. Sanford Shieh has 
suggested to me that Lewis may have derived the idea of  it from Royce, or, one might add, it may 
have come that way through Peirce. The use of  “the method of  substitution” in a broader sense is 
of  course mentioned in the TLP 6.24, and has a long history in mathematics. 
100 As Wittgenstein argues, the notion of  “following a rule” involves customs, institutions, Praxis 
(PI 7, 24, 51, 197, 202). These are at heart routines that are shareable – just as Turing’s “machines”, 
with their commands are. 
101 Cf. Sieg 2013, 24n for historical contextualization and discussion. 
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Any theory is evidently only a Fachwerk of concepts or a schema of 
concepts together with their necessary relations to each other and the 
basic elements can be thought in arbitrary ways . . . 102 
This evidently did not move Frege, who objected to Hilbert’s 
schematic picture of logic, and his insistence that logical 
consistency of a theory in mathematics is enough. But for us it is 
important to note that the image of Fachwerk, however picturesque 
as a memento of Göttingen, is static, structural, holding a house 
together: Hilbert wanted an image of complete organization of a 
theory by means of its logical analysis and axiomitization. 
Wittgenstein counters with the idea of logic in motion: scaffolding 
that plays no structural role, and can be modularized, taken down 
and put back up again as needed. In the end, it disappears. This 
suits the fluidity of simplicity, as well as Turing’s idea of 
proceduralization. 
On Wittgenstein’s view, logic draws aspects out of 
characterizations, it characterizes characterization itself, and 
discusses and reflects on this (i.e., on logic itself). “Same” and 
“different” are fundamental notions here, as are the notions of a 
“character” and “charactery” and order, handwriting with 
orientations of letters, specific arrangements. The notion of 
hanging together as a whole, while being step-by-step configured, 
link- or band-wise, is held together in a strong, specific, but 
transportable structure that is contingent, as a matter of fact, but 
gives rise to step-by-step necessities, once it is configured. 
Simplicity is not simple, but it is: a mixture of considerations, 
ontological and epistemological, an ideal of method.103 Wittgenstein 
works hard on orientations of letters, even mentioning handwriting 
as a mode of Lebensform in the PI at PPF i 1.  
Turing’s analysis is impervious to what the specific signs might 
be in a particular computational routine. But a Turing machine has 
two faces: one static (a set of quintuples), one dynamic (the moving 
action of a machine given its commands). Turing has perfectly 
interwoven, in general, the interstices between juxtaposition and 
                                                          
102 Hilbert to Frege 29 December 1899, Frege 1980, 42; “scaffolding” is used to translate Fachwerk, 
but “half-timbering” would be better. 
103 Cf. Floyd forthcoming b. 
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concatenation, without confusing them, has kept in play the 
dynamic and the static, the complex and the simple, placing them all 
into one self-standing space, sitting within our world of “ordinary 
phraseology”. For the list of quintuples that define one of his 
“machines” are a set of commands that may be listed in any order 
(the concatenated ordering within each command is taken for 
granted). But what such a “machine” does is to concatenate dynamic 
possibilities of step-by-step procedures, moving forward.  
The problem responded to is as ancient as Socrates’s dream in 
the Theaetetus.104 It is thematized as well in Aristotle’s mocking of 
the atomists in Metaphysics, who “lazily neglected” to face the issue 
of movement in accounting for the simples, thinking that the 
difference between AN and NA, or H and could be accoun-
ted for in their terms alone.105 
It is our agreements in ordering that matter to logic. It is more 
generally agreement in measuring, weighing, gauging, voicing, and 
so on that is the harmony, the Übereinstimmung, of which 
Wittgenstein writes in PI 241. It is on this that not only the having 
of opinions, but even the very idea of “calculation in a logic”, logos 
itself, rigorously depends. 
The logical notions of “concept” and “object” sit rather 
uncomfortably with Wittgenstein’s aspect-thinking, as neither 
extensional nor intensional ways of construing concepts fit directly 
into its way of articulating logic in terms of procedures and iterable 
operations. In PI Wittgenstein had to stress the importance of 
inventing “intermediate links”, because the idea of a totality or 
extension occludes his philosophical treatment of logic. 
Procedures, with our modal and dynamic ways of visualizing, 
applying and imagining them, are a more natural fit with the fluidity 
of simples than are either the notions of concept or object, except 
when these are handled comparatively, as they are within his 
language-games (forms of life).  
Logic as Wittgenstein conceived it has to do, I am arguing, with 
investigations of possible juxtapositions, orderings, concatenations 
                                                          
104 Cf. Parikh and Renero forthcoming. 
105 Metaphysics I 985 15, in Aristotle 1984. 
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(chains), iterable procedures, rules and rule-following. This is why 
the notion of aspect, as opposed to concept, is primary for him. 
Concepts, rules for the uses of words, and so on are understood in 
terms of aspects, not the other way around; the family resemblance 
idea is necessary for Wittgenstein, not simply a picturesque idea of 
generality or historicity inheritance from Goethe and Spengler: he 
has logicized morphology, morphologized logicism. The idea of 
family resemblance is logically robust: like that of a chain or 
interwoven thread, as Wittgenstein says. It is mode-like, modular, in 
its very essence, but it is alive and evolving in comparisons we 
make and act upon. 
Felix Mühlhölzer has remarked, in discussing Wittgenstein’s 
later philosophy of mathematics, that it has a “dark” side: in his 
later writings, Wittgenstein rarely if ever discusses axiomatic 
method. That’s right, but there’s a reason for this. Like Turing – 
and well before he met Turing, when he wrote the Tractatus – 
Wittgenstein did not reduce logic to the axiomatic method. Instead, 
he reduced that method itself to the terms of more general and 
fundamental ideas: rule formulation, catenation, iteration, 
substitution, and calculation: procedures of calculation that can be 
taken in, begin somewhere, and may be carried on, reorganized, 
and articulated indefinitely.  
What Turing did in “On computable numbers” was to logically 
and mathematically rigorize Wittgenstein’s attempted philosophical 
generalization on the axiomatic method. For, partly indebted to 
Wittgenstein, he rooted his analysis of the notion of “calculation in 
a logic”, a “formal system” in a “language game”, a snapshot of 
human calculative behavior, a person with pencil and paper living 
in a social world. Turing analyzed the logical aspect of our notion of 
an “axiomatic” or “formal” system by thinking through what we use 
such a thing for, by what is done with it. 
Mathematicians no longer “come to blows” over whether or 
not a rule has been followed, in Turing’s sense. There is no need to. 
There is, rather, the matter of assessing axiomatizations. As 
Wittgenstein says, judgment is required at the basis to determine 
which ones to embed where, and why, and for what purpose. And 
this too depends upon regularities of response, and our shared, 
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agreed upon proceedings with rules. In this sense the distinction 
between a calculation and an experiment – always an earmark of 
Wittgenstein’s discussions of mathematics – is domesticated, 
brought down to earth. Objectivity is not a concept everywhere 
bounded or constituted by sharp rules or a system of sharp rules. It 
cannot be. But for all that, we still can and do weave scaffolding 
capable of allowing us to proceed, and not come to blows. All this, 
just as Turing said, requires “common sense”, though in PI this 
notion is made dynamic, embedded in regularities of world and our 
human forms of life within it. 
While Turing was an undergraduate Wittgenstein had 
thematized, with “language games”, the idea of a possible set of 
orders or commands and possible movements and reactions, 
possible impositions of procedures and possible steps taken with 
these by human beings living an active, shared life in words. The 
variety is most important, and when Wittgenstein discusses 
Lebensform at the beginning of the PI it is to stress just this. But this 
is not done with the aim of debunking the axiomatic method per se, 
much less logic itself, as if providing it with some kind of 
philosophical rival – for it has none. Turing’s own work can be 
axiomatized.106 
Instead, Wittgenstein wanted to probe down into the 
fundamental interstices of logic. “To imagine a language is to 
imagine a form of life” (PI 19), that is, a possible structuring of life, 
one that shows an aspect of life, draws out procedures we have and 
concoct in life. Echoing that key remark of the Tractatus: form is the 
possibility of (living) structured, proceduralized activity. The end of 
that, however, as Turing wrote (1954, quoted above), is the need 
for “common sense”. 
Wittgenstein always wanted to show, among many other things, 
that logic has no basic propositions (in the sense of Euclid), 
requires no essential appeal to “self-evident” axioms or laws. It is 
not to be conceived as a science of thoughts or propositions in 
Frege’s or Russell’s senses, but rather as an activity in which we 
show how to construct apparent sentences and chains of reasoning 
                                                          
106 Sieg and Mundici forthcoming. 
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that are tautologies and/or contradictions, in which we show how 
– as we might colorfully put it – to get to the limit of “therefore”, 
with no premises needed at all, just a “form” of pure possibility 
leading to nothing but an indefinite substitutability of words. We 
get to operations in which the force of particular word choices is 
made to disappear, so long as one substitutes in accordance with an 
ordered, fixed, procedure. What are fashioned and recognized are 
spaces of possibility, necessary interrelations among thoughts 
through interrelations among possible procedures. Faces of necessity. 
The scaffolding of what is true or false in what we say. 
4.5 PPF i, 1-2: Übersichtlichkeit in the Tapestry of Life 
(Lebensteppich) 
PPF i, 1-2: 
1. One can imagine an animal angry, fearful, sad, joyful, startled. But 
hopeful? And why not?  
A dog believes his master is at the door. But can he also believe that 
his master will come the day after tomorrow? And what can he not do 
here? – How do I do it? – What answer am I supposed to give to this? 
Can only those hope who can talk? Only those who have mastered the 
use of a language. That is to say, the manifestations of hope are 
modifications of this complicated form of life. (If a concept points to 
a characteristic of human handwriting, it has no application to beings 
that do not write.) 
2. “Grief” describes a pattern which recurs, with different variations, 
in the tapestry of life [Lebensteppich]. If a man’s bodily expression of 
sorrow and of joy alternated, say with the ticking of a clock, here we 
would not have the characteristic course of the pattern of sorrow or of 
the pattern of joy. 
We now reach the final occurrences of Lebensform, in PPF. 
These remarks, loose and unpolished, were penned in 1948-9, 
much later than the versions of the PI we have been looking at 
here. Yet Wittgenstein’s preoccupation with Turing, and with 
embedding the notion of Lebensform deeply into the foundations of 
mathematics, and of logic itself, continued. In 1947, as we have 
seen, he was still writing in notebooks about the distinctive “Do 
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What You Do” machine in Turing’s paper of 1936/7, and stressing 
that Turing’s “machines” are really humans who calculate. 
Beginning in the Blue and the Brown Book, language-games were 
conceived anthropologically: the aura of everyday life and culture 
were being drawn in. 107  Here “common sense” and “ordinary 
phraseology” with signs and words are understood to be at work in 
the backdrop, they are part of the “reality”.108  
But Wittgenstein also described his language-games as 
“experiments”.109 There are dangers in speaking only of tribes: for 
what was coming to matter most to Wittgenstein’s pursuit of the 
logical is that these language games are possible formations of action, 
not relativized meanings.110 Wittgenstein’s mature uses of “language 
games” in PI – with their stress on snipping and transporting and 
amalgamating and snapshotting the living variety and interlocking 
applications of procedures in language, imagined “forms of life” 
(and the “criteria” embedded in these, and so on) – replace or 
reconstrue the notion of “common sense” with something more 
plastic, simpler, more evolutionary and dynamic. They are more 
ubiquitous, flexible and creative: more logically self-critical and self-
standing.  
The extraction from animal life involved in Wittgenstein’s 
above-quoted remarks from PPF i further develops the idea of 
embedding Lebensformen in life. Forms of life and imagined language 
games, as we have said, bring life to possibilities and necessities, 
characterizations of characterization itself, and they implement 
repeatable possible procedures or models or routines. What the 
dog does not have – so far – is the power to embed those far-
reaching routines that imbricate one another in our human lives. 
The dog may anticipate its master’s needs, anticipate, remember 
                                                          
107 Cf. Engelmann 2013b for a helpful analysis of  the transitions. 
108 On the phrase “phraseology” see Floyd 2013a, forthcoming c; it may be found in Russell 1920, 
pp. 141, 175, 192 and occurs in BB, 69; it also appears in Wittgenstein’s manuscripts and lectures 
around differing conceptions of  numbers and mathematics, cf. e.g. MS 121, 76 (1939), MS 126, 
131 (1942-43); MS 127, 194 (1943) and LFM 18, 91, 98. Floyd and Mühlhölzer (forthcoming) 
discuss this notion at length in the context of  an analysis of  Wittgenstein’s annotations to a 1941 
edition Hardy’s Course of  Pure Mathematics. 
109 BB, 42, 47; This phrasing is also used in the Francis Skinner version of  the Brown Book, now at 
the Wren Library, Trinity College Cambridge. 
110 Cf. Engelmann 2013b 208ff. on the danger of  “tribes”, noted by Wittgenstein himself. 
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how to apply words to things. But without the farther-reaching 
“modifications” of our “complicated” Lebensform, it cannot hope 
that its master will arrive at a quarter past three in the afternoon 
two days’ hence, vowing revenge by three-thirty if not. Without the 
human signature, the capacity to write down chains of inferences, 
to grasp operations and routines that interweave in this way, to 
project these into new contexts in shareable routines, without all 
these specific modifications of a life that contains expectations, 
such is not part of the life form of the dog. 
In PI Wittgenstein’s language-games model issues of difficulties 
that lead to genuine puzzlement: contrasts and comparisons among 
routines, confusion about how to shuffle parameters, shifts in 
aspects of uses of signs, of different routines, in our perception of 
possibilities and necessities. They draw out Wittgenstein’s whole 
idea of scaffolding: we can put a certain procedural cluster of 
activities up, climb upon it, and then take it down, using it to build 
whatever particular structure we like. Scaffolding is supported by 
itself, and supports nothing. Its parts substitute in for one another 
step by step, or not (scaffolding is a kind of chaining, or binding, 
after all). We leave it behind when we move to forward a particular 
structure, a particular thing said – when the structure we seek is 
erected. But its signature, its way of allowing us to frame and draw 
out new aspects, is there to be drawn out, unfolded, re-erected 
when we need it. 
The tapestry of life [Lebensteppich] is colorful, something we walk 
on and can be enchanted by. It is a suitably human image. The 
foundations are woven, but hold, have their integrity within 
structures we build, or even just upon the given ground, without 
either absolute or merely relative simples. This is a complement to 
the colored squares Wittgenstein earlier devised to communicate 
his new view of simples, quoting from the Theaetetus (PI 46), but it 
draws the image out dynamically, embedding it. Looking down on 
this profusion of interwovenness, we may see aspects, patterns, 
trace routines, see them break off, focus on a part, or try to take in 
the whole. The whole may have borders, but may always be added 
onto. Wittgenstein’s idea of “criss-cross philosophy”, of weaving, is 
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apposite. 111  Logical necessities rest upon no metaphysical 
foundations of the whole, no “glue” 112 , no prior ordering or 
features of the world, but instead upon our activities in fashioning 
links in our world, one by one. We are binders, working against a 
universal backdrop, a whirl of life. Logic is concerned with 
establishing procedures and possible procedures, as well as 
plumbing the limits of certain kinds of procedures. Insofar it can 
come to be indefinitely imbricated and impressed, ubiquitously, in 
lives with speech and with language. 
Wittgenstein’s explicit reconsideration of logic as “sublime” 
reaches a certain high watermark in PI 92, 122. Here, meditating on 
his Tractatus idea of a “final analysis”, in which the “essence” of 
language, propositions, and thought-as-such lies hidden “beneath” 
the surface, he describes his contrasting, more mature idea as one 
according to which the very depth of the possibilities of these 
phenomena are something 
…that already likes open to view, and that becomes surveyable 
[ubersichtlich] through procedures of ordering [durch Ordnen]… (PI 92)113 
And he adds that  
A surveyable representation [Übersichtliche Darstellung] produces 
precisely that kind of understanding which consists in ‘seeing 
connections’. Hence the importance of finding and inventing 
intermediate links (Zwischengliedern). (PI 122) 
It is notable, as I have said (though it is hardly often stressed) 
that the ideas of sequencing, ordering, finding and inventing 
                                                          
111 Z 447, discussed also by Diamond 2004. In Diamond’s sense, I am arguing that in a sense the 
PI still addresses itself  to a Big Question (“What is the nature of  the logical?). But the mature 
Wittgenstein answers that one can only answer that question in a certain down to earth way, by 
way of  smaller pieces and reflection on their interweavings in life. The transition as I am 
envisioning it is less from “wholesale” to “retail”, giving up on Big Questions altogether (as 
Diamond has it), and more about projecting the Big Question all the way through to its real 
foundations. For the origin of  “crosswise” proof, which I think is the origin of  this later remark, 
see BT 130, 456: “The inductive proof  puts the equation together crosswise, as it were, instead of  
lengthwise.”  
112 As Wittgenstein put it in his letter to C.K. Ogden about Tractatus 2.03 (CCO 1973, 23). Cf  
RFM V 24 for a critique of  another kind of  glue-conception that causes us to lose hold of  the 
special character of  logical technique when we mathematicize logic.  
113 I have slightly altered the translation here, despite the reasonable argument of  the editors of  
PI. The manuscript basis here (157b, 14-15) shows some struggling on Wittgenstein’s part to 
formulate the idea with sufficient precision. 
Nordic Wittgenstein Review 5 (2) 2016 
 
  67 
intermediate links all belong to Wittgenstein’s particular conception 
of deductive logic, and so, of analysis. A deductive argument is 
classically regarded as a chain among terms and arguments, an 
ordering of thoughts or propositions, as we have seen. Only more 
recently has the process of logicizing come to be construed in 
terms of sequences, and, most recently of all, as a sequence of step-
by-step commands, or orders, a routine off-loaded and treated as a 
transportable module. 
Behind these remarks in PI lie many others. In manuscripts of 
1939-40, written during and after Turing’s attendance at his lectures 
on the foundations of mathematics (LFM) and later published as 
RFM III, Wittgenstein had attempted to frame a deepened, more 
refined application of his perspective on logic and the foundations 
of mathematics, returning to the themes broached in FF. In these 
remarks he developed and applied his notion of Übersichtlichkeit to 
Principia Mathematica, criticizing Whitehead and Russell’s version of 
a reduction of arithmetic to logic.  
His examination of the surveyability of proof swims in the wake 
of his discussions with Turing in the spring of 1939, and points 
forward to what we see in PI. As Felix Mühlhölzer makes clear in 
his commentary on these manuscripts in RFM III (2006, 2010), to 
be “surveyable” simply means to be something that can be “copied, 
in the manner of a picture”. The image is one of a shareable survey, 
one we can express and work through, and reproduce, sharing it 
with harmonies and agreements among us about what counts as a 
sufficient copy. Wittgenstein is working his way forward toward the 
applications of Lebensform in PPF. 
The idea is that the so-called “foundations” of mathematics 
should be worked through or ordered in the light of Wittgenstein’s 
conception of logic. But in his writings he is offering, as 
Mühlhölzer explains, a Klarlegung or Grundlegung of mathematics, not 
a Grundlagen (cf. LFM lecture 1, Mühlhölzer 2010 passim). As Turing 
himself wrote (1944/5, 245), mathematical logic is “an alarming 
mouthful for most mathematicians, and the logicians are not very 
much interested in making it more palatable”. The solution Turing 
proposes is to make symbolic logic disappear: he proposes to 
rework and organize the ordinary “phraseology” of “the 
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mathematician-in-the-street” so that whatever merging of logic and 
mathematics might go on, it will require the mathematician to learn, 
ideally, very little of mathematical logic.  
So it is today, with the use of modern computational routines: 
software is developed in light of our uses of it, and to achieve 
further compression, routinization and also, of course, freeing of 
humans from calculative routines. 
4.6 PPF xi 343-363: The Ribbon of Life (Band des Lebens), 
Lebensform as the “Given” 
PPF xi: 
343. But am I really trying to say that the certainty of mathematics is 
based on the reliability of ink and paper? No. (That would be a vicious 
circle.) – I have not said why mathematicians do not quarrel, but only 
that they do not.  
344. It is no doubt true that one could not calculate with certain sorts 
of paper and ink, if, that is, they were subject to certain strange 
alterations – but still, that they changed could in turn be ascertained 
only through memory and comparison with other means of 
calculation. And how, in turn, are these tested? 
345. What is the accepted, the given, is – one might say – forms of life.  
. . . 
358. One can indeed be convinced by the evidence that someone is in 
such-and-such a state of mind: that, for instance, he is not pretending. 
But there is also ‘imponderable’ evidence here.  
359. The question is: what does imponderable evidence accomplish? 
Suppose there were imponderable evidence for the chemical (internal) 
structure of a substance; still, it would have to prove itself to be 
evidence by certain consequences which are ponderable. 
(Imponderable evidence might convince someone that a picture was a 
genuine . . . But this may be proved right by documentation as well.)  
360. Imponderable evidence includes subtleties of glance, of gesture, 
of tone.  
I may recognize a genuine loving look, distinguish it from a pretended 
one (and here there can, of course, be a ‘ponderable’ confirmation of 
my judgement). But I may be quite incapable of describing the 
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difference. And this not because the languages I know have no words 
for it. Why don’t I simply introduce new words? – If I were a very 
talented painter, I might conceivably represent the genuine and the 
dissembled glance in pictures.  
361. Ask yourself: How does a man learn to get an ‘eye’ for 
something? And how can this eye be used?  
362. Pretending to be in pain, for example, is, of course, only a special 
case of someone producing expressions of pain without being in pain. 
If this is possible at all, why should it always be pretending that is 
taking place – this very special pattern in the weave of our lives [auf 
dem Band des Lebens]?  
363. A child has much to learn before it can pretend. (A dog can’t be a 
hypocrite, but neither can it be sincere.) 
In the second, rougher, part of PI we see that the accepted, the 
“given” are Lebensformen (PPF xi, s. 345). Here Wittgenstein is 
pointing toward issues thematized in On Certainty, drawing out the 
notion of “certainty” in mathematics. Forms of life are just 
wherever we do begin. There are hard necessities in procedures, 
step-by-step. There are simples. But it is always contestable to 
begin here rather than there, to break off one routine and turn to 
another, to take a part of a routine out and put it in elsewhere, to 
change a routine, alter one’s sense of a face, to take a face in, and 
so on. Forms of life evince aspects that may be altered, compared, 
worked with, and run through. 
As part of logic in a primordial sense, this idea of the “givens” 
is very ancient. Euclid, as we have said, calls them “data”.114 As we 
know, this just means something given (say, a particular 
construction) with a request for us to show that something else can 
be done given it. This sort of “given” is not, as it became in Russell 
later on, an empiricist’s object of immediate and infallible 
“acquaintance”: that image breaks the chaining idea, pinning it 
down, limiting it. Rather, in later Wittgenstein a “given” is a gadget, 
a starting point in life, something cobbled together in the stream of 
life.  
                                                          
114 And so, appropriately, Kenny (2006, 13) calls “forms of  life” “the ultimate data” in W., a 
replacement for the simple “atoms” of  the TLP. 
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Forms of life, as “the given” are the simples, our starting points. 
They are not given through self-evident propositions, such as those 
put forward as such, dogmatically, by Moore. Nor are they 
proposed as actual courses of action or descriptions of what is 
really going on when we speak – though as Wittgenstein repeats 
again in this context (just as he had in PI 240), mathematicians in 
fact do not come to blows over what is to count as an acceptable 
step (PPF xi 343). When once they did - intuitionists and classical 
logicians – as a matter of fact they found a way around it, in 
procedures of formalization, with the help of logic. Forms 
(possibilities of structure) are whatever we make to be “given” in 
the course of considering and exploring, not only proposed objects 
of comparison, but proposed starting and juncture and stopping 
points, simples, accepteds (as we might call them). It does not 
matter, for purposes of the classification of logic itself, where we 
begin. What matters is that we get the beginnings themselves into 
the right sort of frame.  
The ancient metaphysical picture of Aristotle, that relatively 
static tree structure of concepts, does not hold for the general 
foundation of logic itself. But in Turing and Wittgenstein, logic itself 
shows its own limits. Not by way of any “miracle”, but by way of 
us.  
Wittgenstein’s image of a “band” or “ribbon” or “volume” of 
life [Band des Lebens] is his answer to the whole idea of a colorful 
conception of life, perhaps even his book’s life, perhaps his own 
life’s work in philosophy (in logic). It is a reworking of the ancient 
idea of chains and bindings in logic. It is an image of, for, in and by 
logic as philosophy.  
We are binders: of words and sentences, of procedures, of 
routines and activities, of ourselves with one with another, of 
thoughts and words and actions. We put elements together in 
arrangements that hold. We are capable of binding ourselves to 
procedures and routines. Chains and bindings can be broken, or 
broken off, or amalgamated, or simplified, or rearranged, shuffled, 
entwined, according to purpose – or, in fact, merely aimlessly, 
emptily, or decoratively. In Wittgenstein’s mature philosophy, these 
bindings must be fashioned without a base-level of fixed simplicity, 
Nordic Wittgenstein Review 5 (2) 2016 
 
  71 
even though every binding entangles us with simples. In PI at PPF 
xi 358ff. this idea of a Band des Lebens works out the whole idea of 
pretense, of lies, of what logic makes us capable of, and how. This is 
no accident. Wittgenstein is grasping at getting down to the very 
idea of dealing with possibilities and necessities of human actions 
with truth as such. He reverts to his reconception of the notion of 
acquaintance, his Master Simile. 
This brings us to the notion of the “I”, the subject. In the 
Tractatus it had disappeared, a kind of formal “limit”, inconceivable 
as any kind of substance or relata, on the ground that this would 
have made it a complex, but instead, a soul or subject would have 
to be simple (TLP 5.5421). In Wittgenstein’s mature philosophy the 
thinking “I” is still not an object. But it is no longer conceived of as 
a limit, a well-behaved relational aspect or approximation of 
criterial or grammatical procedures. Instead, its simplicity is also 
embedded in the fluidity, the interactional situatedness, of voice, 
procedure, and expression.115 It is not to be conceived of as either 
continuous or “gappy” – as if it were something that might be 
completed by cuts and collections, like the continuum was by 
Dedekind. 116 Instead, it is formed, bound and arranged: bound by 
necessities and possibilities, including those of writing, those of a 
human body and bodies, of traditions and daily routines and voices. 
It is bound by its own bindings (of words and thoughts).  
Wittgenstein pursues a one-leveled, multi-aspectual view of 
form, not ascending to a meta-level or supposing that form may be 
reduced, Hilbert-style, to strings or signs or an axiomatic 
                                                          
115 See Sluga forthcoming for an interesting discussion of  the evolution of  Wittgenstein’s thoughts 
about the “I” through the period of  The Blue Book. 
116 Laugier (2005, 68) pointed me toward this passage at Z 648: “One language-game analogous to 
a fragment of  another. One space projected into a limited extent of  another. A ‘gappy’ (‘löchriger’) 
space. (For ‘inner and outer’.)” I would translate “löchriger” differently than Anscombe does. The 
quotation marks clearly signal an allusion to someone else’s use of  the word. My sense is that 
Wittgenstein is critically alluding to the picture of  using Dedekind cuts to fill in “gaps”, as treated 
in Russell 1920. Dedekind himself  strikes me as more careful with the image, especially in relation 
to Euclid (see Dedekind 1888/1996, Preface to the 1st ed., 793; compare his 1872/1996 §3, 771; 
these are discussed in Floyd 2013b). In Wittgenstein’s work on real numbers, he always attacks this 
picture of  gaps, on which see Floyd and Mühlhölzer manuscript. He is considering transposing his 
way of  thinking about the foundations of  mathematics into the problem of  inner and outer here. 
Note that a chain has no inside and no outside, except when it is folded up, hidden through its 
arrangement. 
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formulation of a theory, or lodged, Hardy-style, in actual, albeit 
purely metaphysical conceptual structures (propositions) 
intrinsically true or false. This is his difficult road in recasting the 
logical: it relies throughout on analogical, comparative thinking. 
And it cuts very much against the usual grain of discussions of 
intension and extension, concept and object, in traditional logic, 
because it is analyzing those notions in terms of something else, 
taken as given: aspects and Lebensformen.  
The contrast is clear. If one treats logic as “merely formal” in 
Hilbert’s way, or the “formalist” way that Frege was concerned to 
attack, then one is forced to say that there must be “metalogic”, 
something “outside” the formalism.117 Wittgenstein always attacked 
this idea. 
The huge shift from Aristotle’s notion of form is that in 
Wittgenstein forms do not ultimately have to correspond to any 
fixed tree-like taxonomic structure or ordered system of life forms, 
essences, substances, or concepts except relatively, and revisably, 
dynamically, as with chains and chains of chains. No such 
hierarchical and grounded structure of forms is revealed in chains 
of reasoning. Forms are linked in procedures, not ranked by terms. 
We cannot any longer regard, e.g., particular syllogisms as 
something revealing life-form essences and their (intensional and 
extensional) relations. In Wittgenstein a logical train of thought or 
an analysis may compel us, but it need not tell us, either that or why 
– again, unlike in Aristotle. We begin with such a chain, and we end 
with it. Logic does not represent: in it we propose, bind, and 
dispose. It reveals itself in that, and that alone.  
Forms – logical and living ones – are linked, not ranked. In 
Wittgenstein forms have to do with procedures, routines, 
possibilities and necessities thereof – these are so ubiquitous. And 
so he self-inscribes and self-thematizes the forms of his own 
procedures in the PI. His remarks are deeply self-embedded in if-
thinking, in possibilities of procedures or phenomena, in loops and 
pieces of proposed and explored chains of argumentation. The 
same might be said of the Tractatus, though there the idioms are less 
                                                          
117 Even Schopenhauer falls into talk about “metalogical truths” of  logic (2010, 56). 
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modular, because Wittgenstein’s ideal of simplicity is one of 
groundedness: as he later put it – critically – he had composed a 
“calculus of undefinables”. 118  This, as Turing demonstrates, we 
cannot have in general. 
In later Wittgenstein the modes (in PI “modifications of this 
complicated form of life” (PPF i 1)), are explicitly thematized as 
aspects, are contextualized and emerge from structure and 
comparison, being treated occasionally compositionally, bottom-
up. Wittgenstein is inclined more and more, as time goes on, to 
stress the varieties of ways aspects emerge and strike us, and the 
variety of our own activities in binding up chains of thoughts. He 
explores the differences here between our capacity as binders and 
those of other life forms (dogs and rabbits), but what is at stake 
here are our bindings, our concepts (“natural history” in 
Wittgenstein’s sense). Aspect is a logical, not a psychological notion. 
The metaphor of a chain naturally connects, then, not only to 
“form” but to “life”. The great “chain” of Being is no longer, as in 
Lovejoy, an ordered, gap-free taxonomic structure in which all 
possibilities are eventually realized. It is a series of processes and 
fluid though structured events of formations of formations of (and 
in) life, necessities embedded in a world of contingencies, in what 
we can do and do and fashion, and what follows from that about 
possibilities for other forms. Such chain-procedures or possibilities, 
which we follow and put together and share, afford opportunities 
for exercises in characterization, analysis, and simplicity that are 
themselves designed to characterize, analyze and simplify the 
notions of characterization, analysis, and simplification. In the later, 
mature Wittgenstein chains have no absolute end or absolute 
beginning, in terms of a fixed place for measuring: there remains in 
general only the schematic “it begins” and “it ends”, the possibility 
of binding (with words, thoughts, actions, streets, gestures, 
procedures…) as such.119  
There is neither an absolute, nor a merely relative notion of 
simplicity here, and no doctrine at all of undefinability. There is 
                                                          
118 Cf. MS 111, p. 31 (1931). Wittgenstein mentions Plato in this passage en passant, anticipating his 
later invocation of  the Theaetetus at PI 46.   
119 The resonance with Turing’s work on morphogenesis 1952 is striking. 
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simply the ubiquity of the capacity for the binding. It is a vision of 
the sublimating of logic – domesticated. 
This may sound like an evolutionary picture in Darwin’s sense, 
and the affinities between Wittgenstein and the pragmatists, for 
whom Darwin was a central figure, have often been noted.120 While 
he would not have denied that logic has evolved from somewhere, 
historically, Wittgenstein would also have insisted – every bit as 
much as the pragmatists, in their anti-reductionist moments – that 
we make history, as actors within it, and especially by talking with 
one another.121 
The words, on this picture, with their evolutions of patternings 
and usages, are part of our dynamic reality. They do not, of course, 
constitute it alone: Wittgenstein is no linguistic idealist. Unlike Hegel, 
Wittgenstein does not suppose that there is any particular end of 
history to be expected: Why would he? If history has ended, if an 
ultimate analysis of logical analysis itself (both logos and logistiké)122 
has been gotten to, then this has happened by embedding it in 
everyday life, ubiquitously. Then it is with schematic, open-ended, 
but ever-possibly-broken-off ways of thinking that we must live 
and think. 
As I have interpreted PI, Wittgenstein was quite aware that he 
wrote in a post-Aristotelian world, in which perception would not 
suffice for any automatic or natural sharing of form unaided by 
artificial forms of articulation. He lived during a time in which the 
form/content distinction itself was being radically recast as an ideal 
of the systematicity of judgment. An overarching systematicity of 
possibilities and/or actualities could no longer be accepted a priori, 
even as an ideal, as a collectivity of form, ordered into a given, 
ranked whole. This much incompleteness does tell us. 
Forms are linked, not ranked, in chains. Chains are put together, 
arranged, and then hold fast, articulated. Chains may be linked to 
one another, side-by-side or end to end or interwoven as in a coat 
of mail. Chains may be folded and unfolded (the root of the idea of 
a conclusion being implicit in, unfolded from, the premises), their 
                                                          
120 Cf. e.g., Misak 2016. 
121 Cf. Wittgenstein 1979 (WVC), 34, n. 1. 
122 On this distinction see Stein 1988, discussed in Floyd 2013b.  
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links substituted for one another indefinitely. Their links may be 
broken off, reassigned, moved, amalgamated, broken into further 
intermediate links, and so on. Some chains are made of paper, 
some of wool, some of iron. Some are linear, some are tree-like, 
some are themselves closed loops. In general, the “being with in a 
chain”, like the notion of “being with in a queue”, is something we 
do with, not beside or to others. Chains may be reproduced, copied in 
the manner of pictures: they are, or can be made, übersichtlich. 
We are responsible for fashioning the links in logic, even in the 
Tractatus’s philosophy. There it is things or objects (Gegenstände) that 
are said to hang together in the Sachverhalte as in a chain, and names 
are said to be linked in an elementary sentence as in a chaining 
[Verkettung]. 123  These chainings open up, as they picture, 
possibilities, opening and closing them off. Placed in operational, 
comparative settings, they thereby allow us to draw in questions 
about how one such opening may or may not be an opening or 
closing of another, how one proposition may or may not be 
logically related to another. 
But only in the later Wittgenstein does how we link, what we 
specifically do in linking, become a thoroughgoing, integrated part 
of logic, part of life itself, rather than (as in the Tractatus), 
something irrelevant to what is bound to show forth anyway, no 
matter what we do or say or try to picture or imagine or fashion or 
how we live.124 And yet, for all that, logic has regained its self-
standing, ubiquitous character in the later philosophy. 
Early and late for Wittgenstein, in logic (philosophy) our 
linkings are part of reality, and our notion of reality, as such. They 
can be – must be – broken off, returned to, rearranged, and broken 
off again. Logic does not represent the world as it is. It composes it 
as it may and must be. As the song has it: forty-nine reasons, all in 
a line, all of them good ones (bound with the links of logic), all of 
them lies.125 
We are binders. We bind ourselves to one another and to 
procedures. We band into groups, friendships, cities. We band 
                                                          
123 TLP 2.03, 4.22. 
124 Narboux 2014, Floyd forthcoming a. 
125 “Forty-Nine Bye Byes”, on Crosby, Stills and Nash Greatest Hits 2005. 
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together words, arguments, volumes, stories, lies, ponytails, 
tapestries, costumes, dress. We band into musical groups, peoples, 
fans. We band through the binding of remarks and reminders. The 
regressive culmination of Wittgenstein’s remarks on Lebensformen in 
the Investigations occur in PPF – what I still think of as “Part II”. 
Here the notion of a “carpet” or “tapestry” of life [Lebensteppich] 
(PPF i, 2) is developed into that of a Band des Lebens (PPF xi 362). 
This is the image of a parade of life forms, a colorful ordering of 
life, lifted from a romantic tradition in which life itself is regarded 
as a ribbon. The passage is translated by Hacker and Schulte as a 
“weave” of life126 to pick up on the connection with the image of 
Lebensteppich; Anscombe had “pattern in the weave of our lives”, 
attempting to be a bit broader. But Band, more or less equivalent to 
“band” in English, is broader still, and more pertinent to 
Wittgenstein’s quarry with his idea of Lebensform as showing us what 
logic is. 127, 128 
*** 
 
Abbreviations of Wittgenstein’s Works: 
 
AWL  Wittgenstein 1979b 
BB   Wittgenstein 1965 
BF  Bearbeitete Frühfassung PI in Wittgenstein 2001 
BT  Wittgenstein 2005 
CCO  Wittgenstein, Ogden, Ramsey 1973 
EPB  Wittgenstein 1969 
FF  Frühfassung PI in Wittgenstein 2001 
                                                          
126 Stern 2004, 167 quotes RPP II §§624-9, which use the interesting notion of  a “filagree”. 
127 I profited from discussion of  a draft of  this paper with the audience at the May 2016 “Forms 
of  Our Life with Language” Conference, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Munich supported by 
the Carl Friedrich von Siemens Stiftung and organized by Chritian Martin. For work on sources I 
have relied on Biggs and Pichler 1993, Wittgenstein 1999, 2001, 2015, and von Wedelstaedt 2007, 
to which Felix Mühlhölzer called my attention. I am indebted to him for many helpful discussions, 
as well as Mauro Engelmann, Martin Gustafsson, Akihiro Kanamori, Yrsa Neuman, Alois Pichler, 
Sanford Shieh, Jonathan Smith, Max Weiss, and the students in my spring 2016 Seminar on 
Wittgenstein at Boston University, especially Kurt Blaenkshen. 
128  Some corrections including rewordings added to this version Dec. 17, 2016 and some 
references amended Jan. 25, 2017 and June 29, 2017 (first publication Dec. 16, 2016), by editor. 
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LFM  Wittgenstein 1976/1989 
NB  Wittgenstein 1979a 
OC  Wittgenstein 1998 
PG  Wittgenstein 1974 
PI  Wittgenstein 2009 
PPF  In Wittgenstein 2009 
PR  Wittgenstein 1980a 
PR  Wittgenstein 1989a 
PT  In Wittgenstein 1989 
RFM  Wittgenstein 1978 
RPP I  Wittgenstein 1980b 
RPP II  Wittgenstein 1980c 
UF  In Wittgenstein 2001 
WA   Wittgenstein 1993-1997 
WC  McGuinness (ed.) 2008 
WCLM Stern, Rogers and Citron (eds.) Forthcoming 
WVC  Wittgenstein and Waismann 1979 
Z  Wittgenstein 1981 
ZF  Zwischenfassung PI in Wittgenstein 2001 
 
References to Wittgenstein’s Nachlass 1999 use the reference system first 
broached in von Wright 1969. 
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